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Cutting Class Action Agency Costs:
Lessons from the Public Company
Amanda M. Rose*
The agency relationship between class counsel and class members in Rule
23(b)(3) class actions is similar to that between executives and
shareholders in U.S. public companies. This imilarity has often been noted
in class action literature, but until this Article no attempt has been made to
systematically compare the approaches taken in these two settings to reduce
agency costs. Class action scholars have downplayed the importance of the
public company analogy because public companies are subject to market
discipline and class actions are not. But this is precisely why the analogy is
useful: because public companies are subject to market discipline, the tools
they utilize to reduce agency costs are more likely to be efficient. This
Article looks to those tools as inspiration for class action reform, proposing
several novel ways to improve current practice.
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Cutting Class Action Agency Costs
INTRODUCTION
Civil procedure scholars routinely explain perceived problems in
class action litigation, such as excessive attorneys' fees and settlements
that shortchange the class, as "agency costs" - the result of class action
attorneys prioritizing their own interests above those of the classes they
represent.1 Volumes have been written analyzing various techniques for
aligning the interests of class counsel with those of class members, and
this mode of thinking has colored a variety of legislative reform efforts.2
The academic approach to corporate law is strikingly similar: corporate
law scholars fixate on the divergence of interest between managers and
shareholders of public companies, and the corporate law literature
evaluating the techniques for aligning those interests could fill its own
library. It is odd, then, that class action scholars have paid so little
attention to the public company analogy. This is particularly so given
the similarity of the agency relationship structure: in both the class
action and public company contexts, the principal is not a single
individual, but a dispersed collective. This presents special challenges,
as collective action problems render ineffective certain monitoring
techniques useful for reducing agency costs in simpler relationships.
1 This approach is traceable to the pioneering work of Professor John Coffee. For
some of his earliest contributions, see, for example, John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the
Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working,
42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983) [hereinafter Rescuing the Private Attorney General]; John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency
in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987) [hereinafter Entrepreneurial
Litigation]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in
Shareholder Litigation, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1985) [hereinafter Unfaithful
Champion] ; John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
CoLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986) [hereinafter Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney].
2 See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No.
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18
U.S.C.); Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of
2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017). In addition to provisions designed to better align
the interests of class counsel with those of class members, these pieces of legislation
also contain provisions designed to alleviate the over-deterrence risk aggregate litigation
can present - or, more cynically, to handicap the ability of class actions to achieve
optimal deterrence. See Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail"
Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1377-78
(2000) (discussing the "two dangers" critics warn class action settlements present:
(1) "the problem of 'sweetheart' settlements, in which the class members' interests are
compromised by class counsel" and (2) "the problem of 'blackmail' settlements, in
which the defendant is bludgeoned into settling cases for more than they are worth").
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Indeed, this feature of class actions arguably makes the public company
a more natural point of comparison than individual litigation.
I do not mean to suggest that the resemblance between the agency
relationship in class actions and public companies has gone
unrecognized. To the contrary, commentators often note the similarity,3
sometimes even referring to the agency-cost view of class actions as a
"corporate-law model."4 It is no coincidence that John Coffee, the
scholar most responsible for developing the agency-cost view of class
actions, is also a corporate-law expert.5 But the analogy has never been
fully explored.6 The main reason given for this neglect is the absence of
3 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Questionable Case for Using Auctions to Select
Lead Counsel, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 889, 898 & n.19 (2002) (analogizing, in passing, the
task of setting counsel fees in class actions to that faced by a board of directors deciding
a CEO compensation package); Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel Issacharoff, The
Participatory Class Action, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846, 860 (2017) (observing in passing that
class action agency costs, as described in critical commentary, "replicat[e] the classic
separation of ownership and control that preoccupied the law of corporate
governance"); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs'
Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1465-66 (1998) (drawing
but not developing the analogy, except to observe that the rules governing class actions
and other litigation groups are akin to default provisions of incorporation statutes); see
also Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring
Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 56 n.86 (2002) (noting that the idea that
institutional investors would make good monitors in securities class actions resembles
"earlier discussion of similar themes in the corporate finance literature").
4 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109, 1129
(2011).
5 See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 1; Coffee, Jr., Rescuing
the Private Attorney General, supra note 1; Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's
Attorney, supra note 1; Coffee, Jr., Unfaithful Champion supra note 1.
6 Professor Coffee goes furthest to develop the analogy in John C. Coffee, Jr., Class
Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000) [hereinafter Class Action Accountability]. In that article,
Professor Coffee points to the importance of the hostile tender offer and proxy contest
to public company governance as a way to motivate his proposal to enhance class
member opt-out rights and promote solicitations of competing opt-in class actions. Id.
at 422-23 (noting that solicitation of competing class actions "is the equivalent of a
hostile tender offer because it asks class members to 'vote with their feet' and leave one
class action to join another"). More generally, Class Action Accountability utilizes a
typology of governance techniques commonly employed in the corporate law literature
- exit, voice, and loyalty (often translated to law students as shareholders' tripartite
rights to sell, vote and sue) - to conceptualize the options for reducing agency costs
in the class action setting. This typology, which is traceable to Albert Hirschman's
classic book ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970), has been utilized by other class action
scholars, as well. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of
Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 367-80 [hereinafter Governance and Legitimacy in
the Law of Class Actions]. None of the prior literature, however, utilizes this or any other
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market discipline in the class action context, which is thought to render
the comparison unhelpful.7 Shareholders of public companies choose
whether to invest initially in a firm and are free to resell their shares
into a liquid secondary market if they become dissatisfied with the
performance of its managers. In contrast, class members are swept into
a class action without volition, have no practical ability to sell their
claims (except to the defendant in a settlement), and will usually find it
economically irrational to opt out to pursue litigation individually -
even if they believe class counsel is performing inadequately.
The insulation of class counsel from market pressure relative to the
managers of public companies is indeed a critical point of distinction.
But far from being a reason for class action scholars to dismiss the public
company analogy, it is why that analogy has the potential to offer
valuable insights. To see this, consider an agency contract entered
voluntarily by well-informed, self-interested parties, whereby the first
party (the principal) delegates authority to the second party (the agent)
to perform some task on its behalf. The parties to this contract would
have the incentive to adopt techniques that efficiently constrain agency
costs - the costs that arise because, in carrying out the assigned tasks,
the agent will be tempted to place his own interests above those of the
principal. Agency costs include not just the residual loss that results
when an agent acts contrary to the principal's interests, but also the
costs incurred in trying to prevent that residual loss (referred to as
"monitoring" and "bonding" costs in the literatures). Adopting
techniques to constrain agency costs would be in the self-interest of the
agent, because it would allow the agent to demand greater
typology to undertake the comprehensive comparison of public company and class
action governance techniques offered herein.
7 See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 1, at 882-85 (arguing
that agency problems in class actions are distinguishable from those in public
companies because, inter alia, "no informed and active market ... discipline[s] or
motivate[s] the agents in the litigation context"); Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions:
Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 59-60
(1975) (distinguishing the relationship between shareholders and corporate managers
from the relationship between class members and class counsel due to the absence of a
market in legal claims); Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate
Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3165, 3167 (2013) [hereinafter The Governance Problem
in Aggregate Litigation] ("There is no telling act by class members that would look like
the realized buy-in of the capital markets."); Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles
for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 115 (2003) [hereinafter Fundamental
Principles] (observing that the corporate analogy is "not entirely appropriate" because
"there is no market - efficient or otherwise - for class action settlements").
8 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
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compensation for his services. The parties would not succeed in
eliminating agency costs entirely, given that monitoring and bonding
costs are positive. But their choice to enter the relationship would allow
us to infer that its benefits to them exceed those costs.
We can infer no such thing about the relationship that exists between
class counsel and a class. Because class representation occurs by judicial
fiat, we have no market-based assurance that it generates benefits in
excess of costs.9 Nor can we assume that the techniques used to
constrain class counsel from elevating its interests above those of the
class are efficient. Such techniques are not the result of voluntary
bargaining between the parties to be affected, but of choices made by
the drafters of Rule 23 and related legislation.
We can, by contrast, have some confidence that the public company
persists because the net benefits of dispersed equity ownership exceed
those generated by alternative capital structures: when this ceases to be
the case, firms can and do go private. More importantly for purposes of
this Article, we can also place more faith in the efficiency of the
techniques utilized to constrain agency costs in public companies. Like
the agent in the simple bilateral contract imagined above, it is in the
self-interest of corporate managers to constrain agency costs10 : the
inclusion of shareholder-protective measures in a corporate charter
allows manager-entrepreneurs to demand a higher share price in the
company's initial public offering ("IPO"),ii and capital market
discipline incentivizes managers to retain tools to limit agency costs
after the firm has gone public.12 The techniques adopted by public
9 While attorneys seeking the class counsel position will have convinced at least
one putative class member to retain them, it is the court that decides which attorney
will be authorized to represent the class as a whole. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g); cf. 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2018); infra notes 202-203 and accompanying text (discussing
the unique approach to the appointment of lead counsel taken in securities class
actions).
10 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 17-22 (1991) ("All the terms in corporate governance are contractual
in the sense that they are fully priced in transactions among the interested parties.").
For other classic works espousing the view of the corporation as a nexus of contracts,
see Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at
311; see also R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 391 (1937).
11 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1549, 1562-63 (1989) (discussing evidence that differences in charter provisions
are priced by investors).
12 Assuming the company's stock trades in a semi-strong efficient market, managers'
public decision to abandon efficient agency-cost-reduction techniques should cause the
stock price to drop, making future capital raising efforts more costly and exposing the
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companies to constrain agency costs might therefore offer fresh,
market-tested ideas for class action reform.
The purpose of this Article is to explore that possibility. 13 Toward that
end, Part I discusses in more depth the important similarities between
management team to the threat of a hostile change in control. It may also affect
managers' future prospects in the managerial abor market. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288 (1980).
13 Some important caveats are in order. First, public companies do not operate at
an agency-cost-minimizing level, and nothing in this Article should be read to suggest
that they do. Market imperfections and regulatory interventions surely distort the tools
used to align managerial interests with those of shareholders in public companies, a
phenomenon well-chronicled in the corporate law literature. See, e.g., Jens Dammann,
The Mandatory Law Puzzle: Redefining American Exceptionalism in Corporate Law, 65
HASTINGS L.J. 441, 461 (2014) (surveying the empirical literature evaluating how well
the IPO market prices charter terms); Gordon, supra note 11, at 1573-85 (discussing
the possibility that managers can push through opportunistic charter amendments once
the company has gone public and ways of addressing it); id. at 1571-73 (discussing
factors that might lead the legislature to act in ways inimical to shareholder welfare).
Second, public companies and class actions possess immutable differences that may
cause the optimal mix of governance techniques to vary in each setting. These
differences are discussed in Part I and may make some techniques used to constrain
agency costs in one setting impossible or inefficient to replicate in the other.
These realities counsel against unreflectively transposing the tools of public company
governance onto class actions. They do not, however, warrant completely ignoring the
lessons public company governance may have to offer for class action reform. While
imperfections undeniably exist, the managers of public companies remain subject to
strong market forces, whereas in most cases class counsel are subject to none. And
corporate law remains largely enabling, limiting its potential to distort, whereas class
action law is mandatory. Even in those instances in which public companies are forced,
either by mandatory laws or sticky default rules, to adopt or eschew particular tools to
fight agency costs, those laws are likely more efficient (or less inefficient) than those
governing class actions: generally speaking, shareholder interests are better represented
in the political process than those of potential class members, and because both
corporations and the capital they seek are mobile, state and federal corporate lawmakers
face forces of regulatory competition that class action lawmakers do not. Finally, the
immutable differences that exist between class actions and public companies are readily
identifiable and of more limited relevance than might generally be assumed.
A final caveat is in order. The market forces at work in the public company setting do
more than lend credibility to the agency-cost reduction techniques public companies
employ. Those market forces are themselves an agency-cost reduction technique. That
is, capital market discipline does not simply encourage managers to adopt tools that
minimize agency costs, it also operates to align managerial interests with those of
shareholders directly. Consider, for example, the threat of a hostile takeover or an
activist hedge fund campaign - such threats are thought to do important work to
reduce managerial agency costs in public companies, and they are a byproduct of free
secondary market trading in public company stock. Even those public company
governance tools that are not directly dependent on the existence of a free market in
corporate shares may be affected by those that are. As Albert Hirschman observed long
ago, when it comes to motivating the leaders of an organization, the right of the
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the agency relationship structure in the class action and public company
contexts. It also describes the differences that exist between class
actions and public companies, explaining how these differences might
affect the relative desirability of agency-cost-reduction techniques.
Part II lays the groundwork for the Article's main task. To compare
agency-cost-reduction techniques in the class action and public
company settings, it is useful to employ a common vocabulary; Part II.A
therefore introduces readers to the taxonomy of agency-cost-reduction
strategies developed by Reinier Kraakman et al. in their book ANATOMY
OF CORPORATE LAW ("ACL taxonomy").14 While developed for the
specific purpose of analyzing international approaches to corporate
governance, the ACL taxonomy is general enough to transcend subject
matter. It groups agency-cost-reduction strategies into three categories:
(1) incentive alignment strategies, which aim to align the interests of
agents with those of principals through either a "trusteeship" or
"rewards" approach, (2) governance strategies, which give principals
control over their agents' behavior, and (3) regulatory strategies, which
seek to prescribe agent behavior during the course of the agency
relationship or to regulate the terms upon which agents and principals
enter and exit that relationship.s
As described in Part II.B, U.S. public companies place important
reliance on each strategy, including: incentive alignment strategies in
the form of independent boards (an example of the trusteeship
approach) and performance-based executive pay (an example of the
rewards approach); governance strategies in the form of shareholder
voting; and regulatory strategies in the form of judicially-enforced
fiduciary duties, mandatory disclosure, appraisal and the free
transferability of shares (which in turn facilitates hostile takeovers and
hedge fund activism). By using multiple strategies and approaches,
organization's constituents to "exit" may serve as a substitute for "voice"-based
governance techniques. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability, supra note 6, at 437. In
the corporate context, then, the existence of a takeover market might justify weaker
shareholder voting rights than would be the case if no exit rights existed. While this
suggests that the analogy drawn in this Article should be approached cautiously, it
remains of value. Notably, class members enjoyfewer voice rights than public company
shareholders do, while at the same time lacking effective exit rights. Thus, even if the
voice-based governance techniques utilized by public companies would be insufficient
to minimize agency costs in the class action setting, they might nevertheless represent
an improvement over the status quo.
14 REINIER KRAAKMAN, JOHN ARMOUR, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, HENRY
HANSMANN, GERARD HERTIG, KLAUS HOPT, HIDEKI KANDA, MARIANA PARGENDLER, WOLF-
GEORG RINGE, & EDWARD ROCK, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAw: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 31-36 (3d ed. 2017).
15 See infra Part II.A.
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public companies offer greater protection to shareholders: if one
mechanism fails to operate as intended, another stands behind it. The
mechanisms, in addition to creating redundancies to help protect
shareholders, also offer cross-cutting support to one another. For
example, disclosure (a regulatory strategy) assists in shareholder voting
(a governance strategy), and shareholder voting in turn legitimatizes the
board of directors (a trusteeship strategy). In addition, courts' approach
to fiduciary duty litigation (a regulatory strategy) is influenced by
whether the challenged transaction was negotiated by an independent
board (a trusteeship strategy) or approved by a disinterested
shareholder vote (a governance strategy).
Part III turns to the agency-cost-reduction tools used in the class
action context, comparing them to those used in the public company
context. A very different picture emerges. Class actions rely almost
exclusively on just two mechanisms to combat agency costs: (1) the
percentage-of-the-recovery method of compensating class counsel (a
rewards-based incentive alignment strategy) and (2) judicial control
over class counsel's appointment, case settlement and attorneys' fees (a
regulatory strategy). Governance strategies play no role in combatting
class action agency costs, and while the class representative acts as a
trustee in theory, it is in practice no more than a figurehead chosen by
class counsel.16 Exit-based regulatory strategies are also absent: opt-out
rights mean nothing in small claims class actions, because it is
economically irrational for a class member to pursue individual
litigation, and class members cannot freely transfer their class claims to
third-party buyers.
Placing such heavy reliance on rewards and court-centered regulatory
strategies, to the exclusion of other agency-cost-reduction strategies, is
likely unwise. Most scholars believe that judicial oversight of class
actions is largely ineffective. Moreover, the percentage-of-the-
recovery method of compensating class counsel, while doing important
work to align class counsel's interests with those of the class, has
significant limitations.18
Part IV therefore outlines ways that the more varied techniques used
by public companies to reduce agency costs might be translated, scaled,
and imported into class action practice. Some of the suggestions involve
modest changes to current practice. Others are bolder. On the bolder
end of the spectrum, I suggest the creation of an independent class
16 Securities class actions are a notable exception. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)
(2018); infra notes 202-09 and accompanying text.
17 See infra Part IJI.C.1.
18 See infra Part III.A.2.
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overseer position to be staffed, ideally, by a government actor or non-
profit (consumer-advocacy groups might, for example, serve this role in
consumer class actions).19 The class overseer would play a trusteeship
role more akin to that played by the independent board in public
companies, with authority over counsel selection, fees and settlement.
Governance rights could be granted to class members for the limited
purpose of electing the class overseer, affording it a legitimacy the class
representative lacks under current practice.20 In addition, I suggest that
the regulatory strategy of free transferability be imported into class
action practice by allowing class members to sell their class claims to
third parties any time after certification. This would allow larger stakes
class members to emerge who might, like institutional investors and
hedge funds in the public company setting, take a greater interest in
monitoring the enterprise.21 These larger stakes class members would
also make good class overseer candidates and credible objectors.
Moreover, the possibility that they might choose to opt out and pursue
litigation separately would help to discipline class counsel. In addition,
the level of judicial scrutiny applied to settlement proposals or fee
requests might, like the level of judicial scrutiny applied in fiduciary
duty suits brought against corporate agents, be reduced if trusteeship
and governance strategies like these were utilized.22
These proposals, which build on important contributions in prior
literature, might appear unrealistic at first blush. Class member voting
rights, for example, have long been considered a non-starter, as rational
apathy and collective action problems render the likelihood of class
members casting an informed vote unlikely. Moreover, the transaction
costs associated with selling claims in small stakes class actions seem
prohibitive. Under current practice, this assessment is likely correct. But
another reform has the potential to radically reduce the impediments to
successful implementation of these proposals, as well as to revolutionize
class action practice in other important respects. This reform also finds
inspiration in the public company analogy.
Public company governance does not exist in a vacuum. A variety of
external institutions exist that, together, create a capital market
infrastructure of sorts. This infrastructure is not captured in the ACL
taxonomy, but it operates to greatly reduce the cost, and increase the
effectiveness, of public company governance. The EDGAR database
19 See infra Part IV.B.1.a.
20 See infra Part IV.C.
21 See infra Part IV.D.
22 See infra Part IV.B.1.b.
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operated by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), for example, provides free and easy access to all public
company filings, making mandatory disclosure meaningful.23
Shareholder voting is aided by the existence of share depository
institutions, which maintain ownership records for public company
stockholders, as well as by firms specializing in proxy administrative
functions. Stock exchanges and clearinghouses facilitate low-cost share
transfer, which is critical to hostile takeovers and hedge fund activism.
Class action governance lacks any comparable supporting
infrastructure. There is no comprehensive database of class action
filings.24 Nor is there a central repository that tracks potential class
members and provides an efficient way of communicating with them.
Finally, no platform exists that would allow class members to easily sell
their class claims to third parties.
Given technological advances, a more efficient class action
infrastructure is within reach, one that more closely approximates the
infrastructure that supports public company governance. Scholars have
long advocated for the creation of an official, comprehensive online
database of class action filings.25 This would, in effect, replicate for class
actions the role played by the SEC's EDGAR database, allowing
researchers and members of the public to search for and obtain class
action information freely and easily. This would be a useful step
forward, but a centralized, government-run class action website has the
potential to accomplish dramatically more. In an essay entitled
Classaction.gov, I explain how the creation of a federally-run class action
website and supporting agency (collectively, Classaction.gov) could
improve the administration of class actions on a number of
dimensions.26
23 See Using EDGAR to Research Investments, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/Article/edgarguide.html (last updated Sept. 5, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/58UX-E7Z8] (explaining that the EDGAR database "provides free
public access to corporate information, allowing you to research a public
company's financial information and operations by reviewing the filings the company
makes with the SEC," and providing instructions on use and a link to the database).
24 See Deborah R. Hensler, Happy 50th Anniversary, Rule 23! Shouldn't We Know You
Better After All This Time?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1615 (2017) (observing that
researchers "face a virtual absence of even the most basic information on how class
actions operate in federal and state courts").
25 See infra note 281.
26 Amanda M. Rose, Classaction.gov, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 2-6), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3534317
[https://perma.cc/MXQ5-T2F6].
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Imagine if, after a broad and effective publicity campaign, individuals
who wished to participate in class actions were invited to register on the
Classaction.gov website. Registrants would be required to provide basic
information about themselves (e.g., name, phone number, email, and
physical addresses), which would allow for the creation of a secure
database that could be searched to identify potential class members in
particular cases. All communications with class members could be sent
through Classaction.gov via a trustworthy @classaction.gov email
address in a uniform, easy-to-digest format. Settlement funds could be
escrowed with the federal government and then deposited electronically
into the accounts specified by eligible class members when they
registered. Every case would have a dedicated page on the
Classaction.gov website where court filings and other important
information would be posted in a standardized format, and where opt-
outs and claims forms could easily be submitted and objections lodged.
Court filings and settlement distribution data would also be fed into a
comprehensive, searchable research database that Classaction.gov
would make freely available to scholars and the general public.
Classaction.gov holds the potential to dramatically increase the
number of class members that actually share in settlement funds, and at
the same time could reduce the costs associated with notice and claims
administration, leaving more money on the table for victims. It would
also render class actions transparent, allowing researchers and the
public to intelligently assess their value in our society. In addition to
producing these and other important benefits that I describe in my
essay,27 Classaction.gov would also render feasible some of the bolder
public-company inspired reform ideas advanced in this Article. For
example, voting for class overseer online via Classaction.gov may be
easy enough that class members would find it worthwhile to participate.
Alternatively, and taking further inspiration from the public company
analogy, registrants could select a proxy (perhaps a government official,
trusted non-profit, or law school clinic) to vote on their behalf in any
case in which they find themselves a class member. Classaction.gov
could also render practical the free transferability of class claims by
operating as an online exchange, providing a platform for the posting
of bids and for effecting secure sales transactions. Because all claims
sales would occur via the website, it would be easy to redirect
communications in the case, as well as settlement payments, to the
purchaser.
27 See id. (manuscript at 20-23, 26-31).
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Clearly, many details would need to be worked out for these reforms
to operate as intended. Part IV attempts to address some of the most
important of these details. The Article then briefly concludes.
I. AGENCY COSTS IN PUBLIC COMPANIES & CLASS ACTIONS
Public companies and class actions share important characteristics
that make the agency-cost-reduction techniques mployed in the
former relevant to the later. In both contexts, agents are tasked with
maximizing the value of claims held by a large collective of persons -
investment claims in the form of shares of common stock in the
corporate context and legal claims in the class context.28 Shareholders
and class members benefit from this arrangement because it allows them
to leverage the agent's expertise. Just as typical shareholders know little
about how to manage a large corporation, typical class members know
28 It is sometimes argued that compensation is an irrelevant goal in small claims
class actions, given that per class member losses are often trivial, and that deterrence
should therefore be viewed as the raison d'etre of this type of litigation. See, e.g., Brian
T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2044
(2010) [hereinafter Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?] (arguing that "small
stakes" class members theoretically should not receive anything at all); Myriam Gilles
& Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of
Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104-05 (2006) ("In reality, there is
generally no legitimate utilitarian reason to care whether class members with small
claims get compensated at ll."). Assuming this is the case, class counsel should still be
viewed as tasked with maximizing the value of class member claims, rather than with
vindicating some general public interest. In a democracy governed by the rule of law,
private parties pursue deterrence through enforcement of the substantive law, and the
substantive law gives legal claims to injured class members, not their counsel. See 28
U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018) (rules of procedure "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right"). Of course, class members themselves might rationally care more
about deterrence than compensation, and thus may wish to pay a very large chunk of
their compensation in attorney fees, if doing so would better motivate class counsel, or
may wish to donate their recovery to, say, a consumer advocacy organization through a
cy pres settlement - the point is merely that class member interests, not class counsel's
view of what it is in the "public interest," should dictate these choices. Notably, a similar
debate has long raged among corporate law scholars, with some arguing that public
company managers hould conceive of their duties as running not exclusively to
shareholders, but rather to society more broadly. See, e.g., C.A. Harwell Wells, The
Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first
Century, 51 KAN. L. REV. 77, 77-78 (2002). The dominant view, however, is that
managers should place shareholder interests first. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441-42 (2001).
Viewing class counsel or corporate managers' duties as running to society generally,
rather than to class members or shareholders directly, has the practical effect of granting
the former wide latitude to place their own interests above those of any other
constituency.
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little about how to manage a lawsuit. Corporate executives and lawyers,
by contrast, are trained for these jobs, and their expertise warrants
granting them a great deal of discretion in managing the enterprises.
The delegation of substantial discretion to corporate executives and
class counsel is also beneficial because the alternative - more direct
management by shareholders/class members - would generate
significantly higher decision costs, and would be beset by well-known
collective action problems, such as rational apathy and free riding.
While this delegation carries important benefits for shareholders and
class members, it also creates room for self-serving agent behavior.29
And the room is wide, not just because the discretion delegated is
substantial, but also because the same informational deficits and
collective action problems that justify that level of delegation make it
difficult for shareholders and class members to effectively monitor and
discipline their agent's performance.
Agency conflicts manifest in similar ways in the public company and
class action contexts. Because neither corporate executives nor class
counsel fully internalize the benefits they bestow on the collective they
represent, they have an incentive to under-invest in efforts to maximize
value on its behalf.30 They also have incentives to act in a more risk-
averse manner than the members of the collective would prefer. This is
because, even though corporate executives and class counsel have less
at stake than the collective on whose behalf they act, they typically have
more at stake than individual members of that collective. Both
shareholders and class members stand to lose only the value of their
29 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 870
(2013) (observing that "[a]gency costs resulting from the divergence of interests
between professional managers and diversified shareholders are simply the reciprocal
of the benefits of specialization").
30 This can lead to generalized shirking - a failure to work as hard at one's tasks as
one would if she stood to reap the entire fruits of her labor. It can also distort specific
decisions. In the corporate context, for example, executives might refuse to negotiate a
profitable merger because it would jeopardize their continued employment, or they
might dismiss the possibility of moving corporate headquarters to a more affordable,
but less prestigious, address. In the class context, plaintiffs' attorneys might choose to
accept an early settlement to avoid the time and expense associated with trial
preparation, even though trial would be more profitable for the class.
Corporate executives and class counsel also have an incentive to over-invest in efforts
that are personally beneficial but costly for the collective. For example, corporate
executives may over-invest firm resources in projects that they personally enjoy or in
compliance efforts that help shield them from the risk of personal liability; similarly,
class action attorneys may invest more time in a case than is efficient if hours spent is a
factor in the award of attorneys' fees.
350 [Vol. 54:337
Cutting Class Action Agency Costs
claims if the enterprise fails.31 Moreover, the value of their claims tends
to be small relative to what their agents have placed on the line.32
Diversified shareholders have only a small percentage of their total
assets invested in any individual company. On the other hand,
corporate executives have considerable human, reputational, and often
financial capital invested in the firm they manage.33 Similarly, class
members often stand to recover only minor losses, whereas class
counsel invest substantial time and resources in pursuit of the case.
Thus, just as corporate executives might avoid risky but potentially
profitable business strategies that shareholders would want them to
pursue,34 class counsel might avoid risky but potentially profitable
litigation strategies that class members would want them to pursue, like
turning down a sure thing settlement offer and threatening to go to
trial.35 Finally, both corporate executives and class counsel face the
31 Shareholders are insulated from liability corporate debts, see KRAAKMAN ET AL.,
supra note 14, at 8-9, just as class members are insulated from liability for litigation
costs and expenses, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Payment of Expenses in Securities Class
Actions: Ethical Dilemmas, Class Counsel, and Congressional Intent, 22 REV. LITIG. 557,
558-59 (2003).
32 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 258 (2004)
(explaining that persons are more likely to be risk averse "in situations in which losses
would be large in relation to a persons' assets and thus would impinge substantially on
his utility").
33 Diversified shareholders are less risk averse than corporate executives not just
because they have a smaller percentage of their assets at risk in any particular firm, but
also because they have eliminated their exposure to firm-specific risk through the
construction of their portfolios. See generally EDWIN J. ELTON, MARTIN J. GRUBER,
STEPHEN J. BROWN, WILLIAM N. GOETZMANN, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS (9th ed. 2014) (providing a general overview of portfolio theory).
For a variety of reasons, corporate executives cannot similarly diversify, and thus
remain significantly exposed to firm-specific risk. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders
Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 17-20 (1986).
34 See Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment,
38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 320-25 (1990) (describing the types of "nonshareholder-optimal
investment behaviors" corporate managers may engage in due to their greater risk
aversion). While corporate managers are typically more risk averse than diversified
shareholders, under some circumstances they may be more risk preferring. See id. at
325-29 (explaining how poorly designed compensation arrangements can lead to this
result); Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations,
71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 326-29 (1991) (explaining that managers of firms on the brink of
insolvency may take greater risks than diversified shareholders would desire in order to
protect their firm-specific investments).
35 Class action attorneys are paid from the recovery, if any, that they generate for
the class. Thus, if they go to trial and lose, they receive nothing. See Coffee, Jr., Rescuing
the Private Attorney General, supra note 1, at 230-31 (providing a numeric example
illustrating how divergent risk preferences can affect settlement choices). Risk aversion
might also lead class counsel to bring "a high volume of cases, thereby spreading [the]
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temptation to siphon value from their principals through self-dealing.
For example, both corporate executives and class counsel have
incentives to take excessive compensation for their services.36
Given the foregoing similarities, it is logical to inquire whether the
techniques used by public companies to constrain agency costs might
provide some guidance for class action reform. In undertaking this
inquiry, however, one must keep in mind that public companies also
differ from class actions in ways that impact the relative desirability of
agency-cost-reduction tools. Indeed, these differences, which are
surveyed below, likely explain some of the observed differences in
public company and class action governance. While this complicates
the analogy this Article seeks to develop, the public company remains a
rich and largely untapped source of market-tested governance lessons
for class action reform.
Duration. The typical lifespans of public companies and class actions
differ. The former have no finite end, living several decades on
average.37 By contrast, class actions that are not dismissed pretrial
terminate when they are tried to judgment or, much more commonly,
when they are settled - a process that takes three years on average.38
This means that time-dependent agency-cost-reduction techniques are
risk, but in consequence investing relatively little time or effort in any single case." Id.
at 231.
36 Conflicts of interest may also exist amongst shareholders and class members. In
the corporate context, for example, a controlling shareholder might extract value from
minority shareholders through an interested transaction. In the class action context, a
settlement might be structured to advantage one subgroup of class members over others.
For example, a mass tort case might be settled on terms that favor current claimants
over future claimants. While these conflicts are important and worthy of study, they are
not treated here. Instead, this Article focuses on the governance techniques employed
to align managerial interests with those of shareholders in non-controlled public
companies, and the potential of these techniques to help align the interests of class
counsel and class members in non-mass tort damages class actions. It is thus limited to
class actions involving legal claims that share a uniformity akin to that of shares of
common stock. Consumer class actions, wage and hour employment class actions,
securities class actions, and many antitrust class actions fall within this important
group.
37 Public companies used to have a much longer average lifespan. See Martin Reeves
& Lisanne Pflschel, Die Another Day: What Leaders Can Do About the Shrinking Life
Expectancy of Corporations, BCG HENDERSON INSTIT. (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.bcg.com/
publications/2015/strategy-die-another-day-what-leaders-can-do-about-the-shrinking-
life-expectancy-of-corporations [https://perma.cc/S3LB-XHEY].
38 Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee
Awards, 7J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 820-21 (2010) [hereinafter An Empirical Study
of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards].
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less likely to be effective in the class action context than in the public
company context.39
Size. It is also the case that some governance techniques that are
efficacious for public companies might simply be too expensive to be
worthwhile in the class action context.40 This is because the aggregate
value of shareholder claims in a typical public company greatly exceeds
the aggregate value of class member claims in a typical class action.41 As
a result, the magnitude of potential residual losses from agency costs is
greater in the public company context, warranting a larger expenditure
on preventative measures.42
Judicial Involvement. Another difference, which again relates to the
costs of preventative measures, concerns the pervasive role of the
judiciary in the class action context, as compared to the sporadic role
the judiciary plays in the life of a public company. Since the court is
inevitably involved in overseeing a class action, the marginal cost of
conscripting the court to play a role in policing agency conflicts is fairly
small. This is not to say that judicial oversight is effective,43 just that it
is a cheaper approach in the class action setting than it is in the public
company setting. It is also the case that judges are better equipped to
3 Consider, for example, a technique that required a monitor to periodically make
a decision to retain or replace the agent based on their track record of performance. In
the class action context, this may not work because there may be an insufficient track
record upon which to base the determination until the end of the litigation.
40 It is also the case that governance techniques that are efficacious for large public
companies may be too expensive to be worthwhile for smaller public companies. See
Michal Barzuza, Inefficient Tailoring: The Private Ordering Paradox in Corporate Law,
8 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 131, 175-76 (2018).
41 The average market capitalization of a company in the Russell 3000 Index, a
benchmark for the entire U.S. stock market, exceeds $8 billion (median $1.6 billion).
See George S. Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality Blindspots in
Securities Regulation, 64 UCLA L. REV. 602, 664 n.287 (2017). One study calculates the
average class action settlement at $55 million (median $5.1 million). See Fitzpatrick,
An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, supra note 38, at
827-28. Settlement values may, of course, understate the true value of class member
claims. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing how risk averse class
counsel might accept suboptimal settlements).
42 Assume, for example, that agents will appropriate 1% of the enterprise's value if
left unmonitored. Whereas it would make sense for shareholders in a public company
worth $1 billion to spend up to just under $10 million to avoid this loss, class members
in a class action worth $100 million should spend less than $1 million to do so.
43 To the contrary, many scholars think that it is not. See infra note 262 and
accompanying text.
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evaluate the performance of an attorney than they are a corporate
executive, given that they train in law and not in business.44
Complexity. The tasks corporate executives are delegated
responsibility to perform are relatively more complex than those
assigned to class counsel. This is not to minimize the challenge of
prosecuting a class action, but simply to recognize that managing a
public company is a much larger and more multifaceted endeavor. This
means that, all else equal, the performance of class counsel should be
relatively less difficult to monitor, measure and evaluate than the
performance of corporate executives. As discussed below, however, all
else is not equal.
Information Costs. For one thing, class members lack the low-cost
source of information about agent performance that shareholders enjoy
in the form of stock prices. As explained in the introduction, the
presence of free secondary market trading in public company stock,
along with a competitive IPO market, gives a credibility to public
company governance tools that class action governance tools do not
possess.45 It also organically produces its own governance tools (think
hostile takeovers and hedge fund activism). Free secondary market
trading carries a third benefit, as well: it offers a free and easily
accessible source of information about managerial performance, in the
form of stock prices, which can help facilitate the use of other
governance tools. For example, stock price performance can help
shareholders decide whether to vote for or against incumbent directors,
and it can be used as a basis for setting executive compensation. Of
course, relying on stock prices too heavily might also cause distortion,46
and other sources of information may be as good or better indicators of
44 Those who sit on the Delaware Chancery Court are better equipped than most
judges to understand complex business matters, given the prevalence of such matters
on their docket and, in many cases, their prior experience practicing corporate law. But
even these judges acknowledge their limitations. See, e.g., In re J.P. Stevens & Co.
Shareholders Litigation, 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("[B]usinessmen and
women are correctly perceived as possessing skills, information and judgment not
possessed by reviewing courts.").
45 Supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
46 Some argue that an excessive focus on stock prices leads corporate executives to
adopt a destructive short-term mindset. See Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-
Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 541, 544-46 nn.3-7
(2015) (citing the literature both in support of and against this argument); see also
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1084-85 & nn.268-71 (2007) (discussing the argument
that the stock market is myopic and surveying relevant literature). It might also create
incentives for executives to manipulate financial results. See Alfred Rappaport, The
Economics of Short-Term Performance Obsession, 61 FIN. ANALYSTSJ. 65, 69 (2005).
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managers' contribution to firm value. The point is merely that stock
prices play an important informational role in the public company
context with no clear analogue in the class action setting.
Level of Rational Apathy. Another factor helps compensate for the
greater relative complexity of the corporate executive job, and hence
the greater difficulty shareholders face in monitoring and disciplining
their agents: on average, shareholders have stronger incentives to
monitor and discipline agent performance than do small-claims class
members, as well as a better capacity to do so. While the median level
of incentive and capacity should be low across both groups, there is
greater variation amongst public company shareholders than amongst
class members in small-claims class actions. Public company
shareholders include small-stakes, individual investors. These
shareholders are very similar to class members in small-claims class
actions: both tend to be rationally apathetic and unsophisticated. But
some public company shareholders represent "smart money."47
Smart money shareholders include not just sophisticated investors
who fuel stock price discovery by trading on information, but also
professionally managed institutional investors, like mutual funds and
public pension funds, who take buy-and-hold positions. The rise of
institutional investors is a relatively recent phenomenon in the United
States,48 one attributable to changes in the way that Americans channel
their retirement savings.49 Institutional investors hold greater stakes in
the public companies they invest in than do individual shareholders,
and a handful collectively represent effective control of many large U.S.
corporations.50 Given their sophistication, the size of their holdings,
47 See Caroline Banton, Smart Money, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/s/smart-money.asp (last updated Mar. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/FY75-2QDF]
(defining "smart money" as "the capital that is being controlled by institutional
investors, market mavens, central banks, funds, and other financial professionals").
48 In 1950, public equity was held predominantly by households, with institutional
investors holding just over 6%; by 2009, institutional ownership had risen to over 50%
of all public equity and 73% of the equity of the thousand largest U.S. public companies.
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 29, at 874. This does not mean that households are
less exposed to public equities than they were in 1950; to the contrary, the number of
households so exposed has risen dramatically. See Gerald F. Davis, A New Finance
Capitalism? Mutual Funds and Ownership Re-concentration in the United States, 5 EUR.
MGMT. REV. 11, 15 (2008) (finding that the level of household exposure jumped 30%
from 1977 to 2004). Rather, it reflects the fact that households are more likely today to
be invested through an institutional intermediary, such as a mutual fund or pension
fund. See id.
49 For an overview of these changes, see Gilson & Gordon, supra note 29, at 878-84.
50 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 879-80 (1991) ("As a result of
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and their concentration, apathy is less rational for institutional investors
than it is for individual investors, and the incentive to free-ride is less
compelling.51 Certain agency-cost-reduction tools used in the public
company context, such as voting, should therefore prove more effective
than in the past, and - more relevant for our purposes - more
effective than would be the case in the class action context.
The actual impact of institutional investors on corporate governance
should not be overstated, however. Even though institutional investors
are better equipped to vote intelligently than most individual investors,
public company managers till largely dictate the voting agenda.52 As
will be discussed in Part II.B.2.a, it can be expensive for a shareholder
to nominate board candidates or propose other issues for a shareholder
vote. Costs and lingering collective action problems dissuade
institutional investors from doing so,53 and these problems are
exacerbated by agency costs within the institutions themselves.54
Perhaps most importantly, those who manage mutual funds and
pension funds are typically evaluated based on relative performance.55
This makes investing in the improvement of particular portfolio
companies unappealing to fund managers, even if doing so would be in
the best interests of the funds' beneficial owners. This is because, unless
a fund is significantly over-weighted in the company's stock relative to
the fund's peers (something that is unlikely for a variety of reasons56)
the growth of institutional holdings during the 1980s, manageable numbers of
institutions now command what would be, if it were voted in a coordinated fashion, a
controlling block of stock in many public companies.").
51 See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 524
(1990) [hereinafter Shareholder Passivity Reexamined].
52 See id. ("For the most part, managers control what shareholders vote on, how
proposals are packaged, when the shareholders vote, and when the shareholders find
out what they're voting on.").
53 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1352 (1991); Gilson & Gordon, supra note
29, at 891-92.
54 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 53, at 1326 (observing that "agency problems at the
institutional level can frustrate efforts to correct agency cost problems at the corporate
level, even if institutional shareholders own sufficiently large blocks to be able to resolve
their collective action problems"). Legal restrictions also discourage mutual fund
activism. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 46, at 1048-50.
55 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 29, at 889-90.
56 See, e.g., Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 51, at 530-66
(surveying a host of legal rules and other factors that make it difficult for shareholders
to amass a large stake in a single company in the U.S.); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory
of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 19-22 (1991) (discussing
provisions in the Investment Company Act of 1940 and in the Internal Revenue Code
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any effort to improve the company's performance will not improve the
fund's performance relative to its peers.5 7
Perhaps as a consequence, mutual and pension funds have done little
to initiate shareholder votes on company-specific matters, like the
composition of the board of directors, or to otherwise push for strategic
corporate changes.58 By contrast, these funds have sometimes taken
initiative with respect to general issues of corporate governance -
issues related to companies' governance structure and processes, as
opposed to corporate strategy.59 This is in line with what theory would
predict, given that "many process and structural issues arise in similar
form at many companies," such that a shareholder can enjoy economies
of scale by offering the same proposal at multiple portfolio companies.60
For example, public pension funds have advanced shareholder
proposals to eliminate certain governance practices thought inimical to
shareholder interests - such as the use of staggered boards - and in
some cases have succeeded in effecting change on a broad scale.61 In
that discourage mutual funds from taking large positions in individual portfolio
companies).
57 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 46, at 1052-53.
58 See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 29, at 867 (explaining that institutional
investors, while not rationally apathetic, are "rationally reticent": they "will respond to
proposals but are unlikely themselves to create them"); Kahan & Rock, supra note 46,
at 1061-62 (explaining that public pension funds, which have been more active than
mutual funds, have nevertheless "steered clear of demanding specific changes in
strategy or management, have not engaged in proxy contests, and, so far, have not even
joined forces with hedge funds in opposing or triggering corporate control
transactions").
59 Process and structure issues include things like "the value of confidential voting,
the desirability of poison pills and other antitakeover devices, the composition and
structure of the board of directors, the process by which directors are nominated,
whether a company should have a nonexecutive chairman, and the form of management
compensation." Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 818 (1992) [hereinafter Agents Watching Agents].
Company-specific issues, by contrast, include such things as "whether to recapitalize;
whether to fund a new project by borrowing or by selling stock; whether to make a
particular acquisition or divestiture; whether to vote for the incumbent directors or for
a dissident slate." Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 51, at 581.
60 Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 59, at 822.
61 See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 29, at 887-88 ("Over the 2004 and 2005 proxy
seasons, mutual funds voted in favor of shareholder proposals to require shareholder
approval before adopting a poison pill almost 80% of the time, and in favor of proposals
to declassify the board of directors 90% of the time. The same results appear for the
2003 through 2008 period: Mutual fund voting in favor of shareholder proposals to
declassify the board reached 87.4%, and with respect to shareholder proposals to
require shareholder approval for a poison pill, 68.4%."). Public pension funds have been
more active in advancing shareholder proposals than mutual funds. Mutual funds have,
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this regard, their activities strengthen the claims of this Article, by
providing greater reason to believe in the efficacy of widely-used public
company governance tools: those tools are subject to greater
shareholder scrutiny than ever before.
Over the course of the last decade, activist hedge funds have also
become an important part of the "smart money" crowd. Unlike mutual
funds and public pension funds, activist hedge funds routinely take
outsized positions in particular firms. They do this precisely in order to
challenge underperforming management teams,62 with the hope of
profiting off the increased stock price expected to result from their
efforts.63 The changes sought often are not of general governance
practices, but relate to the company's strategic direction.64 For example,
activist hedge funds might demand that a company return cash to
shareholders rather than pursue a plan of reinvestment, at the threat of
a campaign to oust some or all of the board of directors. Activist hedge
funds typically do not have the voting power to credibly threaten
change alone, but rather must garner the support of traditional
however, frequently voted in favor of shareholder proposals advanced by public pension
funds, and have also "adopted policies to vote against certain changes in governance
rules that entrench the current board if such changes are proposed by the board of
directors, and these funds have sometimes withheld votes (i.e., abstained) in director
elections." Kahan & Rock, supra note 46, at 1043.
62 See Alessio M. Pacces, Exit, Voice and Loyalty from the Perspective of Hedge Funds
Activism in Corporate Governance, 9 ERASMUS L. REV. 199, 199 (2016) (explaining that
"[a] ctivist hedge funds engage the management of an underperforming listed company
in which they have bought a significant stake," seeking "to determine a change in the
governance or in the strategy, from which they will profit by selling their shares at a
premium after performance has returned to full potential"). But see John C. Coffee, Jr.
& Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate
Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 582-83 (2016) (observing that studies do not
consistently support the idea that hedge funds target only firms with poor managerial
performance or high agency costs).
63 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 46, at 1027 (explaining that, unlike mutual and
pension funds, hedge funds "tak[e] high stakes in portfolio companies in order to
become an activist, rather than diversifying and becoming involved (if at all) only ex
post when companies are underperforming"). Activist hedge funds differ from
traditional institutional investors in other ways, as well. For example, "they suffer from
fewer conflicts of interest, face fewer regulatory restrictions, and have ... [an] incentive
structure" that better aligns fund managers' interests with those of fund investors.
Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential
Decision Model, 107J. FIN. ECON. 610, 611 (2013); see also Pacces, supra note 62, at 203
(explaining that, "[d]ifferently from other institutional investors, hedge funds managers
charge a performance fee in addition to a percentage of the asset under management,"
which operates to "align[] their incentives with investors having a relatively high
appetite for risk").
64 See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 46, at 1029-43 (discussing examples).
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institutional investors to accomplish their goals.65 Thus, the two groups
today work together to impact corporate management, with the mere
potential of their involvement affecting managerial incentives ex ante.66
The social value of activist hedge funds is a hotly debated issue. Some
view them as providing important discipline that helps align managerial
incentives with those of shareholders,67 whereas others believe that they
(or some subset of them) seek short-term stock price bumps at the
expense of long-term firm value.68 The empirical evidence evaluating
these claims is mixed and inconclusive.69 For our purposes, the
important point is that, for better or for worse, activist hedge funds
clearly influence how public companies are managed today. There are
no analogous forces shaping class action governance.
Supporting Infrastructure. Another important difference between
public companies and class actions has already been alluded to. Public
companies benefit tremendously from a market infrastructure that
supports their agency-cost-reduction efforts.70  Share depository
institutions, for example, assist in identifying current shareholders for
purposes of disseminating voting information.7 1 Voting is further
assisted by the existence of firms specializing in proxy administrative
functions.72 Share depository institutions also lower the transaction
65 "The average activist block is roughly 8%, far less than a control block." Gilson
& Gordon, supra note 29, at 899.
66 See id. at 897.
67 See, e.g., id. at 917 (taking this view while acknowledging the risk "that both
institutional investors and activist investors may be myopic, to the end of increasing the
value of a speculative option").
68 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126
YALE L.J. 1870, 1873 (2017) (taking this view).
69 See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 62, at 551-52; Gilson & Gordon, supra note
29, at 901; Pacces, supra note 62, at 201.
70 See Using EDGAR to Research Investments, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
71 For a description of this process, see Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.
htm (last modified May 23, 2007) [https://perma.cc/V7W9-Q4WN]. The mechanics of
shareholder voting are far from optimal, however. See generally Concept Release on the
U.S. Proxy System, 75 Fed. Reg. 42,982 (July 22, 2010) (exploring the weaknesses);
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J.
1227 (2008) (same). The SEC is currently evaluating ways to improve the voting
process. See, e.g., November 15, 2018: Roundtable on the Proxy Process, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/proxy-roundtable-2018 (last modified Feb. 22, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/YE4C-8A5Z].
72 See Steve Schaefer, The Broad Reach of Broadridge, the Most Important Financial Firm
You've Never Heard Of, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2013, 8:00 AM EDT), https://www.forbes.com/
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costs associated with secondary market transactions, as do organized
stock exchanges and clearinghouses.73 In addition, the SEC offers
investors a free, trustworthy, and easily searchable online database of
public company disclosures.74 Class actions lack a comparable
infrastructure. There is no free, easy to search centralized atabase of
class action filings.75 Identifying and communicating with class
members remains a difficult and often very expensive process.76 And no
platform currently exists that would facilitate the low-cost exchange of
class claims.
The differences spelled out above caution against rashly concluding
that public company governance tools necessarily belong in the class
action toolkit. But they do not negate the usefulness of the analogy.
Even if public company governance techniques are not directly
transplantable to the class action context due to underlying differences,
they might still inspire analogous techniques that could work effectively
for class actions. Moreover, changes to class action practice and
procedure might open up opportunities for transplantation that do not
currently exist. Indeed, certain of the reforms discussed in Part IV -
such as the creation of Classaction.gov - would have precisely this
effect. The remainder of this Article demonstrates that, notwithstanding
the foregoing differences, there are vast, as-of-yet unexplored
sites/steveschaefer/2013/10/30/the-broad-reach-of-broadridge-the-most-important-
financial-firm-youve-never-heard-of/#cff4df033e04 [https://perma.cc/9XK8-DXXU].
73 See generally Neal L. Wolkoff & Jason B. Werner, The History of Regulation of
Clearing in the Securities and Futures Markets, and Its Impact on Competition, 30 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 313, 315-39 (2011) (discussing the evolution of a central clearing
and settlement system for securities in the United States).
74 See EDGAR - Search and Access, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/
edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm (last modified July 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/F9HZ-
CBD4].
75 Stanford Law School, in collaboration with Cornerstone Research, has created a
free searchable database of filings in federal securities class actions. Securities Class
Action Clearinghouse, STAN. L. SCH., http://securities.stanford.edu/filings.html (last
visited July 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/2CH3-PPMV]. But nothing comparable exists
for class actions more generally. Public Access to Court Electronic Records ("PACER")
is an electronic public access service of United States federal court documents, including
those filed in class actions brought in federal court, but it is fee-based, difficult to use,
and excludes information about state court cases. See Find a Case (PACER), U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/court-records/find-case-pacer (last visited Aug. 28, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/TR5L-ADUW].
76 Rose, supra note 26, at 26-27.
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opportunities for intellectual arbitrage from the public company to the
class action context.
II. AGENCY-COST-REDUCTION STRATEGIES
A common vocabulary will facilitate comparison of the approaches
taken to reduce agency costs in class actions and public ompanies. The
"exit-voice-loyalty" taxonomy has sometimes been used to discuss
agency-cost-reduction strategies in both settings,77 with "exit" referring
to the discipline that agents feel if disappointed principals can freely
exit the relationship, "voice" referring to principals' ability to directly
influence the behavior of the organization and/or its agents, and
"loyalty" referring to legally-imposed fiduciary duties that agents owe
their principals.78 It is an insightful taxonomy, but it is limited by its
generality. The ACL taxonomy developed in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW is more nuanced and functional.79 While specifically
designed to assist in a cross-country comparison of corporate
governance techniques, the ACL taxonomy transcends ubject matter
and thus offers a useful vocabulary for our task.80 This Part both
introduces readers to the ACL taxonomy and uses it to familiarize them
with the most important techniques used to reduce agency costs in U.S.
public companies.
A. The ACL Taxonomy
The agency-cost-reduction strategies that comprise the ACL
taxonomy are divided into three groups: incentive alignment strategies,
governance strategies, and regulatory strategies. Incentive alignment
strategies work by manipulating agent incentives to bring them closer
in line with those of principals.81 Governance strategies empower
77 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
78 This conception of loyalty is different from the one that Hirschman used in his
seminal book, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES. Hirschman conceived of loyalty in terms of the attachment
that principals feel for an organization, which increases the likelihood that they will
chose to exercise voice rather than exit when agents disappoint. See HIRSCHMAN, supra
note 6, at 77-78.
79 See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 31-38 (describing a taxonomy of legal
strategies for protecting principals).
80 See id. at 32 (explaining that the legal strategies described "span the law's
principle methods of dealing with agency problems"; "[t]hese strategies are not limited
to the corporate context; they can be deployed to protect nearly any vulnerable
principal-agent relationship").
81 See id. at 35-36.
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principals by facilitating their control over agent behavior.82 Regulatory
strategies, by contrast, are prescriptive, "dictat[ing] substantive terms
that govern the content of the principal-agent relationship" and
"tending to constrain the agent's behavior directly."83 Key to the efficacy
of incentive alignment strategies is the ability to understand and
manipulate agent incentives correctly. The efficacy of governance
strategies depends on the ability of principals to use their control rights
effectively, something that will be influenced by the severity of the
collective action problem they face.84 Regulatory strategies, for their
part, "depend for efficacy on the ability of an external authority - a
court or regulatory body - with sufficient expertise to determine
whether or not the agent complied with particular prescriptions."85
As depicted in Table 1, incentive alignment, governance, and
regulatory strategies may each be further divided. Incentive alignment
strategies seek to remove or mitigate conflicts of interest through either
a "trusteeship" or "rewards" approach.86 Trusteeship involves
identifying parties who will be driven primarily by conscience, pride or
reputation (as opposed to high-powered monetary incentives) and
placing them in a position to manage the enterprise or, more commonly
in the corporate context, in a position to monitor the financially-
incentivized agents tasked with managing the enterprise.87 A rewards
approach, by contrast, seeks to improve agent incentives by promising
agents a financial reward if they successfully advance the principals'
interests.88 Governance strategies may be subdivided into "appointment
rights," which refer to the power of principals to select and remove
agents (or those who oversee the agents), and "decision rights," which
refer to principals' power to initiate or ratify agent decisions.89 Finally,
regulatory strategies may be subdivided into "agent constraints," which
refer to rules and standards that regulate the actions of agents during
the course of the principal-agent relationship, and "affiliation terms,"
which affect the terms upon which agents may enter the principal-agent
82 Id. at 31.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 32.
86 Id. at 35-36.
87 Id. at 35.
88 Id. at 36.
89 Id. at 37.
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relationship, as well as the terms upon which principals may exit the
relationship.9 0
Table 1. Strategies to Reduce Agency Costs
Incentive Alignment Governance Regulatory
(mitigates conflicts) (empowers principals) (prescriptive)
Trusteeship Rewards Appointment Decision Agent Affiliation
Rights Rights Constraints Terms
B. The U.S. Public Company Example
Using the ACL taxonomy as an organizational device, this subpart
provides an overview of the agency-cost-reduction strategies typically
employed by public companies in the United States. The techniques to
be discussed are summarized in Table 2; readers who are familiar with
them may wish to skip ahead to the last paragraph of this subpart.
Table 2. Strategies to Reduce Agency Costs: U.S. Public Companies
Incentive Alignment Governance Regulatory
Trusteeship Appointment Rights Agent Constraints
Independent Boards Election/Removal of Fiduciary Duty
Other Gatekeepers Directors Affiliation Terms
Rewards Decision Rights Mandatory Disclosure
Incentive Compensation Bylaw Amendments Appraisal
Fundamental Transactions Free Transferability
1. Incentive Alignment Strategies
From the independent board of directors to high-powered executive
compensation packages, incentive alignment strategies play a key role
in the fight against agency costs in U.S. public companies.
a. Trusteeship
The corporate board of directors is a central feature of public
company governance in the United States and an example of the
trusteeship strategy in action. While the primary operational and
strategic management of public companies is delegated to the
corporation's executive officers, who are clearly motivated by high-
powered financial incentives, these xecutives are overseen by a board
of directors possessing ultimate authority.91 The board, whose members
90 Id. at 32-33.
91 Delaware law, which governs the vast majority of public companies in the United
States, mandates that "The business and affairs of every corporation ... shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(a) (2019).
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are elected by and thus ultimately accountable to shareholders, is
responsible for hiring the chief executive officer ("CEO"), setting the
terms of executive compensation, monitoring executive performance,
and approving major initiatives, among other functions.
Unlike executives, directors are not full-time employees of the
corporation, meeting in person as a full board only four to five times a
year on average and typically holding significant business positions
elsewhere.92 They are therefore compensated more modestly than
members of the executive suite, and generally are motivated more by
reputational considerations than financial ones.93 As a result, they are
less likely to engage in self-dealing or to conspire with those who are.9 4
This is true at least for those directors who are not also members of the
executive suite (so-called "outside" directors) and who are otherwise
independent from it - a group that, due to regulatory requirements,
today must comprise a majority of the entire board and the entirety of
the board's audit, compensation, and nominating committees.9 5
The corporate board of directors is an example of a decision system
that separates decision management (initiation and implementation)
from decision control (ratification and monitoring), the former being
delegated to executives and the latter reserved to the board. Professors
Fama and Jensen have hypothesized that any voluntary organization
that separates residual risk bearing from decision-making control will
adopt such a system - any organization where the managers do not
bear the major wealth effects of their decisions, thus creating the risk of
92 See NATALIE COOPER, BOB LAMM & RANDI VAL MORRISON, DELOITTE, BOARD
PRACTICES REPORT: COMMON THREADS ACROSS BOARDROOMS 11 (2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/center-for-board-effectiveness/articles/us-board-
practices-report-common-threads.html [https://perma.cc/4HJM-QMPA].
93 Compare Bernie Tenenbaum, How Much Should I Pay the Director on My Board in
2020?, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernietenenbaum/2020/
01/16/how-much-should-i-pay-the-directors-on-my-board-in-2020/#7858d8305372
[https://perma.cc/8M7D-E4GV] (estimating average total annual compensation for
public company directors at $170,000), with David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, CORP.
GOVERNANCE RESEARCH INITIATIVE, CEO COMPENSATION: DATA SPOTLIGHT 2 (2019),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-quick-guide-17-ceo-
compensation-data.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JKX-86VM] ("The typical CEO of an S&P
500 company receives approximately $10 million in annual compensation.").
94 See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 35.
95 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3) (2018); NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL § 303A.01-07 (2009); NASDAQ LISTING RULE § 5605 (2017). Both the NYSE
and NASDAQ "define 'independence' similarly: a director will be deemed independent
if she has no financial or familial ties to the firm or its management other than her
directorship." Urska Velikonja, The Political Economy of Board Independence, 92 N.C. L.
REV. 855, 857 n.2 (2014).
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significant agency costs.96 Decision hierarchies where higher level
agents ratify and monitor the decision initiatives of lower level agents
and evaluate their performance, they argue, make it more difficult for
decision agents at all levels of the organization to take actions that
benefit themselves at the expense of residual claimants.9 7
Another example of the trusteeship strategy in action is the use of
external "gatekeepers" whose association with public companies is
thought to discourage fraud and other forms of malfeasance.98 These
gatekeepers include accounting firms, who audit public company
financial statements, as well as investment banks who assist companies
in the public offering process.99 While compensated monetarily for their
services, these firms should not ordinarily be willing to sacrifice their
reputation for the sake of a single client.100 Thus, if in their close
interactions with a client company they were to detect managerial
misconduct, they could be expected to blow the whistle, to the board or
outside authorities.
b. Rewards
Direct board monitoring of executive performance has its limitations.
Independent directors have competing obligations and suffer from
informational asymmetries relative to members of the executive suite,
giving inside directors significant influence.101 Board monitoring of
executives is therefore typically supplemented by the use of high-
powered incentive compensation, most importantly restricted stock
awards and stock options.1 02 Restricted stock does not vest, and thus
cannot be sold by the executive, for a period of time after it is granted.
Stock option awards give executives the right, for a period of time after
96 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301-02 (1983).
97 Id. at 310.
98 STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS
938 (5th ed. 2019).
99 Id.
100 See, e.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Easterbrook, J.) ("An accountant's greatest asset is its reputation for honesty, followed
closely by its reputation for careful work. Fees for two years' audits could not approach
the losses [the auditor] would suffer from a perception that it would muffle a client's
fraud.").
1t See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOwA L. REV. 127,
161 (2010) ("Informational asymmetries inherent in the role of independent directors
... limit such directors' ability to be effective monitors.").
102 See MATTEO TONELLO, PAUL HODGSON & JAMES REDA, THE CONFERENCE BOARD,
CEO AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PRACTICES 40 fig.1.4 (2017).
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some vesting period, to purchase stock from the company at a pre-
determined "strike" price, which is usually the market price of the stock
at the date of the grant.103 During the vesting periods, restricted stock
and stock options create incentives for public company executives to
work hard to increase their firm's stock price, even if their contributions
are otherwise unobservable to the board.104 But this type of
compensation also operates to increase the firm-specific risk executives
bear, driving a further wedge between their risk preferences and those
of diversified shareholders.105 Stock options uniquely have a "built-in
antidote" for this problem, however, because they are valuable to
executives only on the upside and thus encourage risk taking. 106
Of course, the devil is in the details. Pay packages, however
structured, present an opportunity for agent self-dealing. To help guard
against executives manipulating the terms of their own compensation,
a variety of supporting agency-cost-reduction techniques are employed,
nicely demonstrating how the various strategies for constraining agency
costs in public companies mutually support one another. For example,
the details of executive compensation packages are negotiated by the
board's independent remuneration committee, with the advice of third-
party compensation consultants, thus marrying the trusteeship and
rewards strategies.107 Governance strategies also play a supporting role:
as discussed below, the pay packages of top executives are now subject
to a periodic advisory shareholder vote, a (quasi) decision right.108
Moreover, board and shareholder oversight of executive pay is aided
through the regulatory strategy of mandatory disclosure. In addition,
the free transferability of shares - also a regulatory strategy - is what
permits secondary market trading in public company shares, creating
the stock prices which in turn function as an objective compensation
metric.109 Free transferability also permits hostile takeovers and activist
hedge fund campaigns, the threat of which helps guard against agency
103 See David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of
Optimal Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611, 618-19 (2011).
104 They also aid in retention, because the awards are typically forfeited if the
recipient does not remain employed with company on the vesting date. See id. at 650.
105 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
106 David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of
Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 456 (2000).
107 See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 66-67.
1os Equity compensation plans are also subject to a shareholder vote pursuant to
stock exchange listing rules. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
§ 303A.08 (2009); NASDAQ LIsTING RULE § IM-5635-1 (2017).
109 See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
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costs, including extreme compensation abuses.1 1 0 And while courts
have been reluctant to police pay as a general matter, fiduciary duties
- another regulatory strategy - may play a small role in constraining
gross abuses in the negotiation of executive pay packages.111
2. Governance Strategies
While the board of directors has primary responsibility for
monitoring executives and setting the terms of their compensation,
shareholders retain some power of self-governance. This power has
become more meaningful in recent years, as the rise of institutional
investors has mitigated the severity of the collective action problem
shareholders face.
a. Appointment Rights
Shareholders have the right to elect and remove members of the board
of directors.11 2 This should, in theory at least, tie the allegiance of
directors to shareholders, making them faithful monitors of the
executive team. Historically, however, shareholder appointment rights
have not been viewed as an important restraint on boards (at least
outside the takeover context), making independent director
requirements a relatively more promising approach for preventing
board capture by executives.11 3 In part, this is because boards, not
shareholders, have tended to control the election and removal process.
110 See infra notes 179-184 and accompanying text.
111 See Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts:
Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers' Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846,
848-49 (2011). Even with these safeguards, the efficacy of executive pay as a constraint
on managerial agency costs remains a topic of robust debate. For divergent perspectives,
compare LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004), with John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay &
Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compensation I efficient Pay without Performance?, 103
MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005).
112 The default rule is that shareholders may vote to remove directors with or
without cause, except cause is required if the corporation has a staggered board or,
under some circumstances, if it has adopted cumulative voting. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(k) (2020). Common shareholders typically have one vote per share, but classes
of high-, low-, and no-vote common stock may also be issued. For an overview of the
considerations raised by the use of such dual-class equity structures, see generally
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock,
103 VA. L. REV. 585 (2017).
113 See WILLIAM ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 164-65 (5th ed. 2016).
2020 ] 367
University of California, Davis
To see why, one must understand that it is cost-prohibitive for most
shareholders to appear in person at annual shareholder meetings, where
votes on director elections and other matters are cast.114 If these
shareholders wish to vote, they must usually appoint another person
who will be present at the meeting to act as their "proxy" and vote on
their behalf.115 The incumbent board always seeks proxy authority from
shareholders, at the corporation's expense (this is necessary so that
shareholder quorum requirements are met).116 But traditionally the
board has not been required to offer to cast proxy votes for candidates
other than those that the board itself has nominated, and it has not been
required to offer to cast proxy votes on a petition for removal of a
director from the board. The board has, in other words, controlled the
content of its proxy ballot (subject to important limitations created by
Rule 14a-8, discussed infra).117 This means that if a shareholder-
proposed removal petition or director candidate were to stand a chance
of being approved, the proponent would have to solicit proxy authority
from fellow shareholders independently. This is an expensive process,
due to, inter alia, a federal requirement that he soliciting party prepare
and disseminate a substantive disclosure document subject to SEC
review and antifraud liability. 118 As a result, it has traditionally been
114 Moreover, most beneficial owners of public company stock are not record owners,
which adds a layer of complication. For an overview of how public company stock is
held in the United States, see Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics, supra note 71.
115 Since 2000, Delaware has permitted remote participation at shareholder meetings
at the board's sole discretion. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(a)(2) (2020). Thus, today
boards may permit absent shareholders to cast direct votes online. But proxy voting
remains the norm. For an overview of the topic, see generally Lisa M. Fairfax, Virtual
Shareholder Meetings Reconsidered, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1367 (2010).
116 See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 113, at 173.
117 For a critique of regulations that have led to this result and argument in favor of
changes that would require use of a universal proxy ballot, see Jill E. Fisch, The
Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435, 495-97 (2012). In
2016, the SEC proposed a rule that would mandate a type of universal proxy ballot but
the rule has not yet been finalized. Universal Proxy, 81 Fed. Reg. 79122 (proposed Oct.
26, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 240); Tiffany Fobes Campion, Christopher R.
Drewry & Joshua M. Dubofsky, Universal Proxies: What Companies Need to Know, HARV.
L. SCH. (Dec. 5, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/12/05/universal-proxies-
what-companies-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/PL9M-PNK2].
118 Shareholders who run a proxy solicitation are not guaranteed reimbursement of
these expenses. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing
Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1071, 1106-10 (1990); cf. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (2020) (permitting but not requiring bylaws that provide for the
reimbursement by the corporation of expenses incurred by a stockholder in soliciting
proxies in connection with an election of directors). The SEC has made some efforts to
limit the costs of complying with the federal proxy rules. In 2007, it passed amendments
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very rare to see removal petitions or contested elections for board seats
outside of the takeover context - or, more recently, outside of the
context of an activist hedge fund campaign.119 Boards have thus tended
to self-perpetuate, with default rules of plurality voting ensuring that
even very unpopular candidates retain their seats.120
The voting process has changed in recent years, however, as
institutional investors have gained more clout.121 The SEC tried, albeit
unsuccessfully, to change the law to require boards to offer to cast proxy
votes for competing board nominees under certain circumstances
(referred to as "proxy access" because it would give shareholders access
to the board's proxy ballot to list competing director candidates).122
Despite the SEC's failure to change the law, this has in fact become the
norm at large U.S. public companies through company-specific bylaw
amendments. Indeed, today 71% of S&P 500 companies allow some
form of proxy access - up from 1% in just 2014.123 Typically, proxy
access bylaws require the nominating shareholder or group of
shareholders to own at least 3% of the company's stock for three years
and limits them to placing nominees on the board's proxy ballot that
would, if elected, constitute 20% or less of the board.124 Moreover, the
nominating shareholders typically cannot have acquired their shares
with the "intent to change or influence control" at the company (a
requirement that, along with the three-year holding requirement, makes
proxy access effectively unavailable to hostile takeover bidders and
activist hedge funds).125
Institutional shareholders have also instigated bylaw amendments at
many public companies changing the default rule of plurality voting for
to the proxy rules to allow proxy materials to be posted on a website, reducing what
needs to be physically mailed to recipients to a notice of internet availability (which
itself can be sent via email if the shareholder has already elected to receive proxy
materials by electronic delivery). Physical copies need be sent only if the shareholder
requests them. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16 (2020).
119 See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259,
1265 (2009).
120 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election
of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 461-62 (2007).
121 For an overview, see ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 113, at 165-66.
122 See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (striking down
the SEC's proxy access rule).
123 SIDLEY, SIDLEY UPDATE: THE LATEST ON PROXY ACCESS 2 (Jan. 11, 2019),
https://www.sidley.com/-/media/update-pdfs/2019/01/20190111-corporate-governance-
update.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/EZD4-XPE5].
124 Id. at 8.
125 See id. at 10.
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director elections to a rule of majority voting.126 The result is that
directors who fail to achieve majority support will not be re-elected even
if no competing candidates are proposed.127 Institutional shareholders
have also repealed other bylaw provisions that dampen the power of
shareholder appointment rights, such as staggered board provisions
limiting annual elections to just a third of the board.128
Shareholders have yet to do much with their reinvigorated
appointment rights, however. Proxy access has not yet been successfully
utilized,129 and very few directors have failed reelection due to majority-
vote provisions.130 Perhaps this state of affairs will change if, as time
passes, institutional investors become more comfortable taking an
active role in the election process, or if reforms are enacted to help
better align the incentives of those who manage institutional funds with
the funds' beneficial owners. More optimistically, it is also possible that
the existence of more robust shareholder appointment rights is serving
a disciplining function currently, without necessitating their actual use
- like the proverbial shotgun in the closet.
The foregoing is not meant to suggest that appointment rights have
been a trivial tool for reducing managerial agency costs in public
companies. As just noted, they may be serving a deterrent function
presently. Moreover, appointment rights have long played an important
supporting role in the context of hostile takeovers, and more recently
in the context of activist hedge fund campaigns.131 This is because both
hostile bidders and activist hedge funds are often willing to incur the
126 See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Does Majority
Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (2016) ("Over the
last decade, the move from plurality to majority voting for corporate directors has been
one of the most popular and successful corporate governance reform efforts.").
127 A director who fails to achieve a majority vote "stays on until the director resigns,
the director is removed, or a successor is elected." Id. at 1122.
128 See KOSMAS PAPADOPOULOS, ROBERT KALB, ANGELICA VALDERRAMA & JARED
SORHAINDO, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, U.S. BOARD STUDY: BOARD
ACCOUNTABILITY PRACTICES REVIEW 5 (2018), https://www.issgovernance.con/file/
publications/board-accountability-practices-review-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/E34T-
5AQL] (observing that, as a result of shareholder pressure, today the full board stands
for reelection annually at a "majority of companies in each of the S&P 500, S&P 400,
and S&P 600").
129 See SIDLEY, supra note 123, at 12.
130 See, e.g., COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, FAQ: MAJORITY VOTING FOR
DIRECTORS 4, https://www.cii.org/files/issues-and-advocacy/boardaccountability/
majority_votingdirectors/CII%20Majority%20Voting%20FAQ%201-4-17.pdf (last
visited Jan. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/923W-ZT9J].
131 As discussed, a hostile bidder must couple a tender offer with a proxy contest in
order to disable a company's poison pill. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
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expense of a proxy contest to get preferred director candidates on the
board.132
When contested elections do occur, shareholders confront he
difficult choice of who to support. Without assistance, they may find it
irrational to take the time necessary to make an informed choice. In
addition to taking cues from stock price performance, shareholders
have two other ways that they commonly economize on voting decision
costs: (1) by relying on proxy advisory firms, who specialize in
providing research, data and recommendations on voting matters,133
and (2) by delegating their voting authority to a trusted third party. A
shareholder who knows little about competing director candidates, for
example, may be familiar with the reputation of a hedge fund that is
soliciting proxies in connection with the election, and may choose to
grant the fund its proxy on this basis.134
b. Decision Rights
In addition to their right to elect and remove members of the board
of directors, shareholders are empowered to make certain other
decisions. As already alluded to, they have the power to both initiate
and approve bylaw amendments, so long as the proposed amendments
are process-oriented and do not infringe on the board's substantive
discretion in overseeing the management of the corporation. 135 As with
shareholder-proposed candidates for the board, shareholder-proposed
bylaw amendments stand little chance of being approved at a
shareholder meeting unless the proponent can marshal the votes of
absent shareholders. If this required that the proponent solicit proxy
authority independently, the cost would deter exercise of the decision
right, just as it has traditionally discouraged exercise of shareholder
appointment rights. But typically shareholders proposing bylaw
amendments do not need to run an independent proxy solicitation. This
is because SEC Rule 14a-8 requires boards to include shareholder
proposals on their proxy ballots, subject to important limitations
132 Because they own a larger share of the company's equity than a typical
shareholder, these actors are more likely to find that the benefits to them of waging a
proxy contest exceed the costs.
133 The two largest are Institutional Shareholders Services ("ISS") and Glass Lewis.
134 See C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The Second Wave of
Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout and Expertise, 40 J. CoRP. FIN.
296, 298 (2016) (finding that high reputation hedge funds "win about three times as
many proxy fights" as other hedge funds).
135 See CA, Inc. v. American Fed'n of State, Cty. and Mun. Emps. Pension Plan, 953
A.2d 227, 234-38 (Del. 2008).
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(including a requirement that the proposal comport with state corporate
law and not involve director nominations or removals).136 When
applicable, Rule 14a-8 eliminates the bulk of the cost a shareholder
proponent would otherwise face if left to solicit proxies independently.
For many decades, Rule 14a-8 was used primarily by investors pursuing
a social agenda, but with the rise of institutional investors it has in
recent years become an important tool for effecting corporate
governance change.13 7  Indeed, the process-oriented corporate
governance reforms previously discussed, such as proxy access,
majority voting, and board de-staggering proposals, have mostly come
about through institutional investors' use of Rule 14a-8.138
Shareholders also have the right to vote on certain fundamental
transactions, such as mergers.139 Unlike with bylaw amendments,
shareholders do not have the right to initiate these transactions, they
only possess the right to approve or veto them. In deference to
managements' expertise, and in recognition of shareholders' expected
apathy, most substantive decisions about the corporation's affairs are
left to the unfettered discretion of the executive suite, subject to board
oversight. Mergers stand as a principled exception. Mergers represent a
very significant event in the life of most companies, and they also
present an area where conflicts of interest between executives and
shareholders are rife. Thus, less deference to management may be
warranted, and shareholders may be more likely to cast an informed
vote. Shareholders' right to vote on other fundamental transactions may
be justified on a similar basis, such as shareholders' right to vote on
charter amendments and corporate liquidations and dissolutions.140
A recent addition to the panoply of shareholder decision rights is the
so-called "say on pay" vote - a periodic shareholder vote on the pay of
top executives mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010.141 Proponents of say-on-pay view it
136 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
137 See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 113, at 208-09.
138 See id. at 209.
139 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2020). Stock exchange listing rules also require
shareholder approval for certain transactions. See, e.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.03 (2009) (describing the situations in which
shareholder approval is a prerequisite to issuing securities).
140 For a fuller treatment of the possible justifications for shareholder voting rights,
see Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129
(2009).
141 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010). Stock exchange listing rules also require
shareholder approval of equity compensation plans. See supra note 108.
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as a way to ensure that executives do not unduly influence the board's
compensation decisions.142 The vote is merely advisory, and thus
constitutes at most a quasi-decision right, but the failure to garner
significant shareholder support in a say-on-pay vote appears to
influence the future pay practices of corporate boards.143 Indeed, the
mere threat of a close say-on-pay vote may temper pay abuses.144
Shareholders are sometimes given additional decision rights at the
board's discretion. For example, while only a majority shareholder vote
is typically required to approve a merger,145 boards may choose to
condition a merger on a higher threshold of shareholder approval. The
board may also give shareholders the opportunity to vote on certain
conflicted transactions when it is not technically required to do so. As
will be discussed in the next section, this is done to protect directors
and officers if the transaction results in fiduciary duty litigation. 146
3. Regulatory Strategies
Key regulatory strategies for constraining agency costs in U.S. public
companies include: fiduciary duties; mandatory disclosure obligations;
the right (in certain limited circumstances) to a judicial appraisal of
one's shares; and the free transferability of shares. It is admittedly odd
to discuss free transferability of shares under the regulatory heading.
After all, it is important to the fight against agency costs precisely
because it unleashes powerful market forces - including hostile
takeovers and hedge fund activism. Nevertheless, free transferability
technically constitutes an affiliation term governing principal exit and
thus will be discussed in subsection b, below.
142 See James F. Cotter, Alan R. Palmiter & Randall S. Thomas, The First Year of Say-
on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank: An Empirical Analysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 967, 971-74 (2013) (surveying the arguments in favor of say-on-pay).
143 See Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd-Frank's Say on
Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL
L. REV. 1213, 1259 (2012).
144 See id. at 1257-58.
145 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2020).
146 See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1983) ("{A]n
informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders, while not a legal prerequisite,
shifts the burden of proving the unfairness of the merger entirely to the plaintiffs.");
Byrne v. Lord, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, at *21 (Oct. 27, 1995)
("[A]lthough shareholder ratification is not required for a court to uphold a [stock
option compensation] plan, it does tip the balance in favor of upholding a plan by
shifting the burden to the plan's challengers.").
2020 ] 373
University of California, Davis
a. Agent Constraints
In the vast number of situations in which neither statutory law nor
the corporation's charter or bylaws dictate precisely what they should
do, directors and officers ("D&Os") are nonetheless constrained by
common law fiduciary principles. These principles impose a duty of
care on D&Os, requiring them to act in their stewardship of the
corporation in the same manner as would a prudent man looking after
his own affairs,147 as well as a duty of loyalty, which prohibits self-
interested behavior.148 Shareholders have the right to enforce these
duties in a derivative suit on the corporation's behalf, when the harm is
to the corporation itself, or in a class action, when shareholder rights
have been affected directly.149 Notwithstanding the broad and lofty
language of fiduciary standards, and plaintiff-friendly rules on
attorneys' fees which encourage enforcement, as outlined below several
factors operate to dampen the importance of fiduciary duty litigation as
a constraint on agency costs in public companies.
This is particularly true in the duty of care context, where liability has
been so pared down as to serve almost no practical function. First, the
so-called "business judgment rule" reflects the judiciary's baseline
position that it will not review the substantive decisions of D&Os, if
otherwise un-conflicted, taken in good faith and consistent with
positive law, absent a showing of gross negligence in the decision-
making process - such as a failure to inform oneself of the facts
relevant to the decision.150 Second, this means of overcoming the
business judgment rule can itself be eliminated vis-a-vis director
defendants in cases seeking monetary damages, if the corporation's
charter contains a provision limiting directorial liability for gross
negligence, as almost all charters of U.S. public companies do.151
Finally, in derivative suits the plaintiff-shareholder must establish that
it would have been futile to ask the board to bring the suit in question.15 2
To establish "demand futility," as it is called, plaintiffs must usually
plead with particularity facts showing that a majority of the board faces
a substantial probability of personal liability, or is beholden to another
147 See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (AM. LAw INST. 1994).
148 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
149 See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036-39 (Del.
2003).
150 See, e.g., Cede, 634 A.2d at 360-61; see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370
(Del. 2006) (setting forth a director-deferential standard for liability based on oversight
failures).
151 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2020).
152 See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993).
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that does.153 And even if demand futility can be shown, the board may
form a "special litigation committee" comprised of untainted directors
who, after investigating the claims, may petition the court to dismiss the
case out from under the shareholder-plaintiff.154 To the extent that
D&Os remain subject to duty of care litigation notwithstanding the
foregoing, their personal financial exposure is negligible, as any defense
costs or amounts paid in settlement will typically be covered by
company-funded indemnification or company-purchased liability
insurance.155
The significant protection afforded D&Os against personal liability
for breaches of the duty of care is not without justification. Such
protection is believed necessary to prevent the threat of liability from
deterring D&Os from taking risks with corporate assets that are in
shareholders' best interests.156 Chilling risk-taking is less of a concern
when the focus of the litigation is a conflict-of-interest transaction or
otherwise involves bad faith conduct, thus implicating the duty of
loyalty; consequently, the law is more solicitous of suits involving such
transactions. Breaches of the duty of loyalty are not protected by the
business judgment rule,157 cannot be exculpated via the corporate
charter,158 and present an easier case for establishing demand futility. 159
The default standard of review when a conflict-of-interest transaction is
at issue is "entire fairness," with the defendants required to prove that
both the negotiation process and the substance of the transaction was
entirely fair to the corporation notwithstanding the conflict - an
onerous burden. 160
Even when it comes to conflicted transactions, however, liability is
far from guaranteed. Courts are loathe to judge in hindsight whether a
business decision was substantively fair, given the difficulty of doing
so. 1 6 1 They have therefore developed procedural workarounds that
allow courts to effectively rely on the board's voluntary, ex ante use of
other agency-cost-reduction strategies in lieu of making an
153 See id. at 933-34 (discussing the demand futility doctrine).
154 See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1980).
155 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2020).
156 See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l. Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052-53 (Del. Ch. 1996).
157 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
158 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2020).
159 See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932-34 (Del. 1993).
160 See Cede, 634 A.2d at 361.
161 See Solash v. Telex Corp., 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 7, at *21 (Jan. 19, 1988)
("[C]ourts have long been reluctant to second-guess [business] decisions when they
appear to have been made in good faith.").
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independent, ex post judgment regarding the merits of the challenged
transaction.162 Take, for example, the case of a conflicted merger
between the corporation and an entity controlled by the corporation's
existing executives. If independent, non-conflicted directors were given
the resources and authority to negotiate the transaction on behalf of the
corporation (the trusteeship strategy), and if a majority of independent,
non-conflicted shareholders approved the transaction after full
disclosure (the decision rights strategy), courts will assume the
substantive fairness of the transaction notwithstanding its conflicted
nature. 163
One of the most significant real-world impacts of fiduciary duty
litigation has been to encourage the use of these procedural mechanisms
in transaction design. Through the development of instructive judicial
case law, fiduciary duty litigation has also heavily influenced board
practices in certain other areas. For example, case law explicates the
type of board defenses to threatened hostile takeovers that are
permissible.164 It also sets forth minimum standards that boards must
follow to avoid liability when overseeing the sale of the company. 165
b. Affiliation Terms
Entry. To access the public capital markets, federal securities law
requires corporate agents to disclose significant amounts of information
related to their management of the company and its financial
condition. 166 These mandatory disclosure obligations continue to apply
after the company has completed its first public offering: companies that
have gone public must, on an ongoing basis, prepare and publish annual
reports with audited financial statements, as well as quarterly reports,
reports in connection with proxy solicitations, and interim reports
162 See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1983) (noting that
while a shareholder vote approving the merger was "not a legal prerequisite," it relieved
defendant directors of the burden of proof); Byrne v. Lord, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, at
*21 (Oct. 27, 1995) (explaining that "although shareholder ratification is not required
for a court to uphold a plan, it does tip the balance in favor of upholding a plan by
shifting the burden to the plan's challengers").
163 See In re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 502-03 (Del. Ch. 2013), affid, 88
A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
164 For an overview of this jurisprudence, see Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the
Transformation of Corporate Governance, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 46-69 (2015).
165 See generally Brandon Mordue, The Revlon Divergence: Evolution of Judicial
Review of Merger Litigation, 12 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 531 (2018) (discussing these
standards).
166 See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 98, at 498-501.
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whenever certain specified events occur between periodic filings.167
Driven in part by the specter of stringent antifraud liability, extensive
care is taken in the preparation of these reports, with various
gatekeepers involved in the process.168
Disclosure provides critical support to the other agency-cost-
reduction strategies discussed. For example, without high-quality
information, shareholders could not cast informed votes, undermining
the value of their appointment and decision rights. A lack of high-
quality information would also make it more difficult for independent
directors to monitor executives and for lawyers to discern potential
breaches of fiduciary duty. Moreover, if the free transferability of shares
is to produce stock prices that accurately approximate firm value - a
precondition to effective use of a stock-based rewards strategy - the
market must receive high quality information. Those considering
launching a hostile takeover or activist hedge fund campaign likewise
benefit from accurate information and the efficient stock prices its
dissemination promotes.169
Exit. In addition to mandatory disclosure, other important affiliation
terms include appraisal and the free transferability of shares, both
techniques focused on how principals may exit the principal-agent
relationship. Appraisal refers to the right that shareholders possess
under state corporate law to sell their shares back to the corporation at
a judicially determined price under certain specified conditions.170
Under Delaware law, which governs the vast majority of U.S. public
companies, appraisal rights are triggered in the case of corporate
mergers (unless the merger consideration is stock in another publicly
traded company).17 1 Thus, if a shareholder believes that the
management team has negotiated an inadequate price in the merger
167 See id. at 203-07.
168 Involved gatekeepers include independent auditors, who certify public company
financial statements, and investment banks, who underwrite public offerings of
securities. See id. at 938-39 (describing these and other gatekeepers involved in the
public company disclosure process).
169 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 384-88 (1970) [hereinafter Efficient Capital Markets]. Mandatory
disclosure can also affect agent behavior more directly. For example, Section 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires public companies to report on the effectiveness of
their internal control processes, a disclosure requirement that in practice acts like an
agent constraint, insofar as it serves as a defacto requirement to adopt effective internal
controls. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745, 789
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262).
170 ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 113, at 488.
171 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2020).
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(perhaps in exchange for side-payments or other personal benefits), but
the merger nevertheless garners a majority shareholder vote (perhaps as
a result of collective action problems), the dissenting shareholder has
the option of foregoing the merger consideration and instead forcing
the company to buy its shares at a (hopefully higher) price to be
determined by the court.
For a shareholder to be entitled to appraisal, however, they must
endure a lengthy and costly legal proceeding as well as meet several
cumbersome procedural requirements.17 2 And because appraisal c aims
cannot be brought as a class action, shareholders must bear these costs
individually.17 3 Until recently, this discouraged shareholders from
seeking appraisal, making it a relatively insignificant tool for reducing
agency costs. In recent years, it has come to play a more important role,
as hedge funds have begun to accumulate large blocks of shares in
anticipation of a merger, with the intention of pursuing appraisal if
unsuccessful in instigating an increase in the merger consideration.1 7 4
Thus, the appraisal right today may serve to discourage underpriced
mergers by increasing their anticipated costs.175
While shareholders can force a public company to buy their shares in
an appraisal proceeding only in certain limited circumstances, they
enjoy nearly complete freedom to resell their shares to third parties on
the secondary market. Free transferability of shares is a core feature of
the corporate form, and as already previewed does significant work to
help reduce agency costs in public companies. First, secondary market
trading in public company stock produces a stock price which at any
given time reflects all publicly available information about the firm,
including about the quality of its management team (assuming the
preconditions to the operation of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis are met176). The existence of such prices helps discipline
public company managers in a variety of ways. For example, the
information conveyed by stock prices assists independent directors as
172 See id.
173 ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 113, at 490.
174 See generally Wei Jiang, Tao Li, Danqing Mei & Randall Thomas, Appraisal:
Shareholder Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage?, 29 J.L. & ECON. 697 (2016) (discussing
these developments); Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the
Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551 (2015) (same).
175 Some question the value of appraisal rights. For an introduction to the debate,
see Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, 41 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 279, 282 (2017).
176 See generally Fama, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 169, at 384-88
(discussing the efficient markets model).
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well as shareholders in evaluating managerial performance.177 Stock
prices are also the foundation upon which stock-based incentive
compensation packages are built. Thus, as with mandatory disclosure,
free transferability of shares supports many of the other agency-cost-
reduction strategies that have been discussed.
In addition, it is only because of the opportunities presented by the
free transferability of shares that hostile takeovers exist. When a
company is underperforming due to poor management, its stock price
will suffer. This creates a buying opportunity for a hostile bidder, who
can profit by amassing a controlling block of the company's stock on
the secondary market and changing its management eam, causing the
value of the firm's stock to increase.178
The disciplining effect the mere threat of a hostile takeover can have
on corporate executives was first recognized by academics in the
1960s,179 but the potency of the threat has diminished substantially
since then.180 This is because boards, with the blessing of the courts,
have devised takeover defenses that dramatically increase the cost of
hostile acquisitions to bidders and thus make them less likely.18 1 The
prime example is the so-called "poison pill," which operates to
substantially dilute the value of a shareholder's investment in a firm, if
the shareholder passes a threshold of ownership without the board's
prior consent. Boards that adopt a poison pill effectively force a would-
be hostile bidder to negotiate the acquisition with the board, rather than
affecting it through secondary market purchases directly. If the board is
unwilling to negotiate, or if the terms it demands are unacceptable to
the bidder, the only realistic alternative is for the bidder to run an
expensive proxy contest to replace the current board with sympathetic
directors.182
177 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1541 (2007)
("As stock prices become more informative, the directors' monitoring role increasingly
consists of using stock price metrics to measure the firm's performance over time and
against relevant intra-industry comparisons.").
178 ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 113, at 531.
179 See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110, 112-13 (1965).
180 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial
Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 73, 102 (1995) (discussing the precipitous decline in the number of hostile
takeovers in the United States since the high of forty-six in 1988).
181 See Cheffins, supra note 164, at 49-56.
182 In the hands of a faithful board, poison pills can be used to help shareholders by
placing the board in a position of strength from which to bargain with the would-be
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While institutional investors have, in recent years, succeeded in
encouraging boards to adopt more shareholder-friendly poison pills and
to disable other defensive measures, hostile takeovers remain a rare
occurrence, limiting (though certainly not eliminating) their
importance in combating agency costs.183 Activist hedge funds, by
contrast, today present a much more salient threat to public company
executives. Their modus operandi has already been discussed184 and will
not be rehashed here, except to emphasize that it is the free
transferability of shares that makes hedge fund activism possible. Hedge
funds could not serve their governance function without the ability to
acquire shares of an underperforming company on the secondary
market at a price that reflects the company's poor management, and to
later resell those shares at a higher price once improvements have been
achieved.185
A few general themes emerge from the foregoing overview of the
agency-cost-reduction strategies utilized in public companies. First,
there is not excessive reliance on any one strategy. Instead, the strategies
operate as fail safes to one another. Faith is not placed only in corporate
boards, or in rewards systems, shareholder voting, judicial oversight, or
the pressures created by the threat of hostile takeovers and hedge fund
activism. Instead, it is placed in the collective of all of these strategies,
with the hope that if one fails to work as expected the others will do an
adequate job to fill the breach. Second, in addition to acting as fail safes
to one another, the various strategies also mutually support one another
in critical ways. The important supporting role played by mandatory
disclosure and informed stock prices has already been discussed, as has
the support courts draw from the use of independent director approval
and shareholder decision rights in discharging their fiduciary oversight
obligations. As yet another example, shareholder appointment rights
give legitimacy to the board of directors and are an essential tool in the
toolkit of both hostile bidders and hedge fund activists. Third and
finally, the relative importance of various strategies has not remained
static over time. For example, as changing patterns of share ownership
have helped to mitigate the severity of the collective action problems
shareholders face, governance strategies and the regulatory strategy of
acquirer over price and deal terms. But in the hands of an unfaithful board, poison pills
can be used to protect underperforming executives from capital market discipline.
183 See supra note 180.
184 See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
185 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 46, at 1028.
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appraisal have taken on greater importance than in the past.186 And as
governance strategies have increased in importance, courts have
increased their willingness to relax their scrutiny of transactions
approved by shareholder-elected boards and/or shareholders
themselves, thereby marking a reduction in the importance of fiduciary
duty as an agency-cost-reduction technique.187
III. CLASS ACTION GOVERNANCE
This Part turns to class action governance, evaluating the techniques
utilized in the class action context to reduce agency costs and
comparing them to those used in the public company setting. These
techniques can be categorized using the ACL taxonomy as depicted in
Table 3. As will become clear, there is far less redundancy in the
techniques used in the class action context, and hence there are fewer
opportunities for cross-cutting support and dynamism. Specifically,
court-centered agent constraints and rewards strategies dominate, with
no serious reliance placed on trusteeship, governance or affiliation
strategies. Given well-recognized problems with judicial oversight of
class counsel as well as with the setting of fees, the near exclusive
dependence on agent constraints and rewards to combat class action
agency costs is likely suboptimal. Part IV will therefore turn to the topic
of reform, proposing several changes to class action practice inspired by
the public-company analogy. These changes seek to build in some of
the redundancy in agency-cost-reduction techniques observed in the
public company context, albeit in a scaled-back manner that
acknowledges important differences between class actions and public
companies.
186 See supra Parts II.B.2.a, II.B.3.b.
187 See J. Travis Laster, Changing Attitudes: The Stark Results of Thirty Years of
Evolution in Delaware M&A Litigation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION 202-28 (2018).
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Table 3. Strategies to Reduce Agency Costs: Class Actions
Incentive Alignment Governance Regulatory
Trusteeship Appointment Rights Agent Constraints
Class Representatives None Judicial Approval of
Objectors Decision Rights Settlement/Fees
Rewards None Rule 11/ Ethical Rules




Notice / Opt-Out Rights
A. Incentive Alignment Strategies
Recall that incentive alignment strategies rely on either a trusteeship
or rewards approach.188 Both approaches play an important role in
public company governance, whereas in the class action context only
the latter does.
1. Trusteeship
As previously explained, trusteeship involves identifying parties who
will be driven primarily by conscience, pride, or reputation and placing
them in a position to either manage the enterprise or to monitor the
financially-incentivized agents tasked with managing the enterprise.
The independent board of directors plays the most important
trusteeship role in the public company context; the class representative
might be thought of as an analogue in the class action context.189 Class
actions are required to have a class representative (also called a lead
plaintiff), just as corporations are required to have a board of
directors.190 Neither class representatives nor directors are typically
given high-powered financial incentives for their service.19 1 Ideally, a
class representative is motivated by conscience to "fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the class," as Rule 23 requires.192 Indeed,
Wright & Miller state that a class representative should be "of such a
188 See supra Part H.A.
189 The court might be conceptualized as a type of trustee for the class, but its role
in class action governance is an example of a regulatory strategy, discussed infra.
190 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
191 Serving as a class representative is not lucrative, if it involves any special
compensation above a pro rata share of the class recovery. See Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 1303, 1347 (2005); William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial
and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1442 (2006).
192 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
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character as to assure the vigorous prosecution . .. of the action so that
the members' rights are certain to be protected."193 This is the language
of trusteeship.
The class representative differs from the independent board of
directors, however, in ways that make it a far less effective trustee. First,
unlike directors, class representatives are not elected by residual
claimants. With the exception of shareholder class actions (discussed
below), the class representative is simply the member of the plaintiff
class named by counsel in the class complaint, subject to judicial
approval for typicality and adequacy.194 Judicial approval is not
rigorous, so in effect the agent picks its monitor.195 As a result, the class
representative cannot be expected to provide true oversight of class
counsel. While similar critiques have been leveled at public company
directors, the hey-day of the CEO-dominated board has largely
passed.196 Independent director requirements today mitigate, at least to
an extent, executive dominance of the board and, given the rise of
institutional investors, shareholder voting ties director loyalty to
shareholders more than it once did. 197
The class representative position differs from the public company
board in another important way: it does not create a true decision
hierarchy. Unlike the public company board vis-a-vis corporate
193 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, JEFFREY BELLIN, DANIEL D. BLINKA,
EDWARD H. COOPER, RICHARD D. FREER, VICTOR JAMES GOLD, KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
PETER J. HENNING, HELEN HERSHKOFF, MARY KAY KANE, THE LATE CHARLES H. KOCH,
ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, RICHARD L. MARCUS, ARTHUR R. MILLER, RICHARD W. MURPHY, ANN
MURPHY, A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, ADAM STEINMAN, JOAN E. STEINMAN, CATHERINE T. STRUVE
& SARAH N. WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1766 (3d ed. 2020).
194 See Rubenstein, supra note 191, at 1443 ("Class counsel typically identify class
actions, select the class representatives from among their client pool or potential client
pool, and then largely ignore the class representative thereafter."). Theoretically the
court could choose another class member to serve as class representative, but "Rule 23
contains no requirement of precertification notice to absent putative class members,"
so there is "no mechanism for absent putative class members to learn that a putative
class action is pending, much less that they are entitled to seek to displace the named
plaintiff in that lawsuit as class representative." China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct.
1800, 1812 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
195 See Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of
Adequacy in Litigation and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2004)
(observing that courts "fail to robustly engage in any meaningful inquiry to establish
the existence of . .. adequate representation").
196 See, e.g., Yaron Nili, Contributions: Successor CEOs, 99 B.U. L. REV. 787, 796
(2019) (explaining that in recent years "shareholders have pushed to separate the CEO
and chairperson of the board positions in favor of an 'independent' chair as a method to
improve board independence").
197 See supra Part II.B.1.a.
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executives, the class representative exercises no decision control over
class counsel. Indeed, the class representative lacks authority to do
anything dispositive: it does not hire class counsel or set attorneys' fees;
it lacks authority to fire class counsel; it has no role in crafting litigation
strategy; and its approval is not required for a settlement to be
reached.198 In sharp contrast, the public company board possesses
ultimate authority over the management of the corporation.199
In the special case of securities class actions, reforms have been
implemented to make the class representative more faithful to the
interests of residual claimants and more powerful - more akin to the
public company board. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 ("PSLRA") requires notice be given to prospective class members
of the pendency of a putative federal securities class action within 20
days of the complaint being filed; recipients must be informed, inter
alia, of their right to move the court to serve as lead plaintiff.200 If
competing lead plaintiff candidates emerge, the PSLRA creates a
rebuttable presumption that the most adequate lead plaintiff among
them is the person or group of persons with the largest financial interest
in the relief sought by the class.201 The provision is designed to
encourage institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiff, on the basis
that such investors will have a better incentive and ability to monitor
class counsel in the interests of the class than smaller-stakes
shareholders selected by counsel.202 For the same reason, the PSLRA
grants the lead plaintiff appointed through this process the authority to
select counsel to represent the class, and to negotiate fee agreements,
subject to deferential court review.203
198 Class representatives have for this reason long been viewed as mere
"figureheads." See generally Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating
Class Representatives in Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165 (1990) (suggesting that the
role of class representative serves no useful purpose).
199 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2020).
200 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2018).
201 Id.
202 The inspiration for the PSLRA's lead plaintiff provision originated in Elliott J.
Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors
Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995). See Elliot
J. Weiss, The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After a Decade, or "Look What's
Happened to My Baby," 61 VAND. L. REV. 543, 548-50 (2008) (recounting this history).
203 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(b)(v); see also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d
201, 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2001) (lead plaintiffs' counsel selection and fee arrangement
should be afforded a strong presumption of validity). Delaware courts likewise favor
institutional investor lead plaintiffs in shareholder class actions brought under state law.
David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment
of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative Actions, 38 DEL. J.
384 [Vol. 54:337
Cutting Class Action Agency Costs
While not without its problems,204 the PSLRA's lead plaintiff
provision is generally viewed as improving the management of
securities class actions.205 But the approach cannot be effectively
replicated, at least under current practice, in most other small-claims
class actions. This is because such actions typically lack class members
with a sufficient financial stake in the outcome of the litigation and level
of sophistication to make them effective monitors.206
In addition to the independent board of directors, certain outside
third parties also serve a trusteeship role in the public company context,
albeit a less central one. Recall that investment banks and auditors serve
as reputational intermediaries whose affiliation with a public company
sends a positive signal to the market. One might view objectors, who
make their views on a proposed settlement or fee petition known to the
court, as serving an analogous role in the class action context.207 But the
influence of these actors on the court differs in important ways from the
influence of reputational intermediaries on the securities markets.
CORP. L. 907, 911 (2014) [hereinafter Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions]. Some
scholars take issue with the premise that institutional investors should be placed at the
helm of securities class actions, observing that their interests may sometimes conflict
with the interests of smaller stakes class members. See, e.g., Burch, supra note 4, at 1123-
27; David H. Webber, The Plight of the Individual Investor in Securities Class Actions, 106
Nw. U. L. REV. 157, 160 (2012).
204 The most troubling concern is the possibility that public pension fund lead
plaintiffs may allow political contributions to influence their counsel selection. See
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of
Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1611-15 (2006).
205 For an overview of the empirical literature evaluating the PSLRA's lead plaintiff
provision, as well as an empirical assessment of the use of institutional lead plaintiffs in
shareholder class actions brought under state law, see generally Webber, Private Policing
of Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 203.
206 See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class
Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 725 (2002) [hereinafter Lawyers on the
Auction Block] (explaining that the PSLRA's "empowered lead plaintiff" model is
unlikely to work well in small claims class actions, "such as consumer fraud cases or
nonpersonal injury products liability cases," because "no class member is likely to have
a sufficient stake in the case to make active participation viable"; "[t]hus collective
action problems will dominate, and lead plaintiff oversight is unlikely to overcome
excessive lawyer control"); Rubenstein, supra note 191, at 1444 (noting that the lead
plaintiff approach taken in the PSLRA "cannot be replicated for most other types of
representative litigation, where the stakes are usually far smaller and the largest
plaintiffs lack institutional incentives to monitor").
207 Lahav, Fundamental Principles, supra note 7, at 119 (similarly observing that in
the class action context "informational intermediaries may include objectors, who
analyze the information provided by class counsel and determine whether or
not . . . opposition to . . . proposed settlements i  appropriate").
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First, when auditors and investment bankers express opinions about
their public company clients, those opinions are based on inside
information that they have been given special access to. Objectors, by
contrast, typically possess no informational advantage relative to the
court. They are not, for example, present at settlement negotiations or
privy to discussions regarding litigation strategy.208 The only new
information they usually bring to the table is their opinion about the
fairness of a settlement or fee petition based on their analysis of
information already in the court's possession.209
Second, objectors play only a sporadic role in class action governance.
Indeed, in most cases no objections are lodged,210 and the absence of
objections is not properly interpreted as a signal of approval. The
absence of objections might be because the settlement or fee petition
contains nothing objectionable, but it could also reflect a collective
action problem - the personal costs of lodging a valid objection will
typically outweigh the personal benefits, even if the class as a whole
would be better off.211 By contrast, public company auditors are true
208 Objectors have no legal rights until after the settlement has been reached. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
209 While objectors can seek discovery, courts are hesitant to grant it. See, e.g.,
Bowling v. Pfizer, 143 F.R.D. 141, 153 n.10 (S.D. Ohio 1992). Moore's Federal Practice
warns:
Discovery should be minimal and conditioned on a showing of need, because
it will delay settlement, introduce uncertainty, and might be undertaken
primarily to justify an award of attorney fees to the objector's counsel. A court
should monitor postsettlement discovery by objectors and limit it to providing
objectors with information central to the fairness of the proposed settlement.
A court should not allow discovery into the settlement-negotiation process
unless the objector makes a preliminary showing of collusion or other
improper behavior.
DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, GREGORY P. JOSEPH, GEORGENE M. VAIRO & CHILTON DAVIS
VARNER, 32 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 21.6 (3d ed. 2020).
210 See THOMAS E. WILLGING, LAURAL L. HOOPER & ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 178 (1996).
211 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623,
1631 (2009) [hereinafter The End of Objector Blackmail?] ("The small number of
objections is usually attributed to the fact that class members often have little at stake
individually in a settlement, making it economically irrational for many of them to go
through the trouble of filing objections."); Lahav, Fundamental Principles, supra note 7,
at 86 (discussing reasons why objectors may not materialize, unrelated to the fairness
of the settlement). Scholars have suggested various forms of incentive payments to
encourage objectors, but funding such payments is difficult and may lead to perverse
incentives. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement,
82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1108 (1996) (encouraging "courts and rulemakers to devise
386 [Vol. 54:337
Cutting Class Action Agency Costs
"gatekeepers": every public company is required to have their financial
statements certified by a public company auditor at least once a year,
when they file their annual reports.212 Moreover, investment banks are
almost always involved in public securities offerings in the United
States.213
Third, in the subset of cases where objections are lodged, the quality
of the signal sent to the court will not be as strong as the quality of the
signal sent to the capital markets by auditors and investment banks.
This is in part because, as already noted, auditors and investment banks
have access to inside information whereas objectors typically do not.
But that is only half the story. Auditors and investment banks also have
substantial reputational capital at risk whenever they affiliate with a
public company.214 The irrationality of risking that capital for a single
client is why the market interprets their affiliation with that client
positively. Class member objectors, by contrast, do not have comparable
reputational capital at risk when they lodge an objection with the court,
and their motivations for objecting are always inherently suspect.215
In addition to class members, non-profits and government actors
sometimes object to a proposed settlement or fee petition in a class
action.216 The signal sent by these objectors may be of higher quality.
This is especially so if they have a track record of working to protect the
interests of the class of people represented in the case and face no
conflicts of interest.217 The potential value of government input
methods to pay objectors," but expressing doubt that a successful model could be
devised); Rubenstein, supra note 191, at 1456-59 (outlining an approach whereby
objectors could be funded by bonds posted by settling parties).
212 CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 98, at 214-16.
213 Id. at 493.
214 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
215 See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or
Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 425-34 (discussing perverse incentives
that may motivate class action objectors); Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?,
supra note 211, at 1633-40 (same); Lahav, Fundamental Principles, supra note 7, at 90
(discussing perverse incentives that may motivate class action objectors). To discourage
objections designed merely to extract a side payment, Rule 23(e)(5) prohibits the
withdrawal of an objection in either the district court or on appeal in exchange for
consideration unless approved by the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5).
216 For example, the Center for Class Action Fairness is a non-profit whose stated
mission is to represent consumers and shareholders pro bono against settlements it
views as abusive. See HAMILTON LINCOLN L. INST., https://hlli.org (last visited July 9,
2020) [https://perma.cc/9V2V-7BX2].
217 See BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FORJUDGES 11 (2005) ("Generally, government bodies such
as the Federal Trade Commission or state attorneys general, or nonprofit entities have
class-oriented goals of ensuring that class members receive fair, reasonable, and
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motivated a provision in the Class Action Fairness Act requiring
relevant government actors be notified of a proposed settlement of a
class action at least ninety days prior to final approval, affording those
actors time to make their views known to the court.218 Unfortunately,
non-profits and government agencies only sporadically make their
views known to the court, and given the resource constraints they face
it is inappropriate to interpret their silence as tacit approval.219
Fourth and finally, in the very small subset of cases where objectors
do step forward and are credible, there is no guarantee that the court
will respond appropriately to the signal received. As discussed further
infra, the court will be naturally biased in favor of approving the
settlement and thus may dismiss or undervalue the input provided by
even trustworthy objectors.220 By contrast, when working efficiently,
the capital markets provide an unbiased estimate of the value of
information, including the information conveyed by reputational
intermediaries.
adequate compensation for any injuries suffered."); Brunet, supra note 215, at 448-64
(explaining that public sector objectors, including government actors and public
interest groups, have better motivations than private objectors); Lahav, Fundamental
Principles, supra note 7, at 132 ("Experienced not-for-profit objectors, such as Public
Citizen Litigation Group, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, or states' attorneys general
should be encouraged to [object] because of their limited financial interest and their
history of responsible involvement in egregious cases.").
218 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2018).
219 In February 2018, the outgoing Associate Attorney General stated in a speech
that the "DOJ [has] receive[d] over 700 CAFA notices every year, but has only
participated in two cases, and those were more than a decade ago." Rachel Brand, Assoc.
Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks to the Washington, D.C. Lawyers Chapter of
the Federalist Society (Feb. 15, 2018). She explained that delays in processing the
notices were to blame and indicated that the DOJ would take a more active role in
policing class actions moving forward. Id.
220 See Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, supra note 211, at 1631
(observing that it "is rare ... for district courts to reject proposed class action
settlements on the basis of objections; only somewhat more frequently do district courts
award fees less lucrative than those sought by class counsel"); Lahav, Fundamental
Principles, supra note 7, at 83 n.73 (collecting cases where a court approved a class
settlement despite significant objections). In some cases objectors have had better
results. See Sean J. Griffith & Anthony A. Rickey, Objections to Disclosure Settlements: A
How-To Guide, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 281, 285 (2017) (describing the authors' success at
lodging objections to disclosure-only settlements in merger class actions: "these
objections have resulted in settlements being dismissed, releases being narrowed to
preserve potential claims, or fees to class counsel being reduced").
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2. Rewards
The rewards approach plays a vastly more important role in class
action governance today than the trusteeship approach. Under the
percentage-of-the-recovery method of awarding attorneys' fees, class
counsel is awarded a percentage of the settlement fund in payment for
its services.221 This helps to align the interests of class counsel with
those of the class because the larger the settlement fund, the larger the
fees awarded. The similarity to stock-based executive pay is obvious.
Indeed, it is often said that contingency fee arrangements effectively
grant the plaintiffs' attorney an equity interest in the outcome of the
case.222
The percentage-of-the-recovery method of awarding attorneys' fees
and stock-based executive pay do very important work to combat
agency costs in their respective domains. But neither is a panacea. Class
action attorneys can game the pay system to reap unjustified rewards,
just like corporate executives. For example, cases brought on the heels
of a government enforcement action may result in a low-risk, near-
certain settlement, and courts may fail to adjust downward the fee
award, giving counsel an undeserved windfall. Non-indexed options
provide a similar windfall to corporate executives, who benefit when
the increase in the company's tock price is attributable to market trends
rather than company-specific performance.223 Class action attorneys
221 "The percentage-of-the-recovery method has now become the dominant method
for awarding fees in class action cases," eclipsing the lodestar method. Fitzpatrick, Do
Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, supra note 28, at 2052. Under the lodestar
method, class counsel is "awarded fees equal to the number of hours they worked on
the case (to the extent the hours were reasonable), multiplied by a reasonable hourly
rate as well as by a discretionary multiplier that could reward class counsel for the risk
of non-recovery." Id. at 2051. A so-called "lodestar cross-check" is often performed on
fees calculated pursuant to percentage-of-the-recovery percentage m thod, however, to
ensure that the fee is not excessive. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 248, 272 (2010) [hereinafter Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action
Settlements]; Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller & Roy Germano, Attorneys' Fees in
Class Actions: 2009-2013, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 937, 945 (2017). In addition to being
awarded a percentage of the recovery, class counsel is reimbursed dollar for dollar for
certain expenses. See Andrew K. Niebler, In Search of Bargained-For Fees for Class Action
Plaintiffs' Lawyers: The Promise and Pitfalls of Auctioning the Position of Lead Counsel, 54
Bus. LAw. 763, 798 (1999).
222 Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189,
189 (1987) (equating a contingency fee with an equity interest in litigation).
223 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power
and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 798-
801 (2002) (discussing this windfall and how indexing can correct it).
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can also attempt to artificially inflate the perceived value of the
settlement fund, just like corporate executives can seek to artificially
inflate the company's stock price.224 And in both settings, while
principled arguments can be made about fee structure, it is difficult to
get a handle on the appropriate overall level. Judges look at what judges
have awarded in other cases,225 corporate boards look at what corporate
boards have awarded in other companies.226 In both settings, the
decision makers are spending other people's money, and the payouts
are often eye popping.227
While class action attorneys and corporate executives are
compensated in similar ways, there are also important differences in
224 This can be done by assigning a higher value to non-monetary relief than is
warranted, or by calculating requested fees based on a settlement that may not actually
end up being paid out in full to the class. See Klement, supra note 3, at 42-43. The
Delaware courts have recently taken steps to tamp down the first sort of abuse in merger
class actions. See, e.g., In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016)
(noting that practitioners should expect that settlements in merger litigation where the
consideration is supplemental disclosures "are likely to be met with continued disfavor
in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address a plainly material
misrepresentation or omission"). In CAFA, Congress also sought to curb these sorts of
abuses. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a), (d) (2018).
225 Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, supra note 28, at 2054
("M]any commentators believe that district courts have no choice but to award
percentages based on little more than intuition or to replicate the percentages awarded
by other courts, which, of course, were probably based on intuition as well."). Courts
often cite a multifactor test when determining the percentage to award, but the test is
so indeterminate that it operates as no real constraint on judicial discretion. See id. at
2053-54. But see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h) (specifying only that the fee must be
"reasonable").
226 See, e.g., Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Executive Superstars, Peer Groups,
and Overcompensation: Cause, Effect, and Solution, 38 IOwA J. CORP. L. 487, 493 (2013)
("In setting the pay of their CEO, boards invariably reference the pay of the executives
at other enterprises in similar industries and of similar size and complexity.").
227 Class counsel might also use their power to block a settlement to siphon value
from class members, just like executives might use their power to block a corporate sale
to siphon value from shareholders. Class counsel might, for example, condition
acceptance of an inadequate settlement on the defendant's promise to support an
excessive fee petition. A corporate executive might similarly condition acceptance of an
inadequate merger price on the acquirer's agreement to pay the executive excessive
amounts for future service to the merged entity. See generally Brian Broughman, CEO
Side Payments in Mergers and Acquisitions, 2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 67. Disclosure rules exist
to help mitigate this sort of abuse in both settings. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(b) (2018)
(requiring, when shareholders are asked to vote on a merger, disclosure of any
agreement concerning any compensation that may be paid to executives in relation
thereto, as well as a separate advisory shareholder vote); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3)
(requiring the parties seeking approval of a proposed settlement to file a statement
identifying any agreement made in connection therewith).
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how their pay is set and in its composition. These differences help to
illuminate potential weaknesses in class action governance. Recall that
in the public company setting, the rewards strategy is buttressed by the
trusteeship strategy: executive pay packages are negotiated by the
board's independent remuneration committee, which is assisted by
third-party compensation consultants.228 Governance strategies also
lend support: periodically, there is an advisory shareholder vote on the
company's pay practices. Judicial oversight of executive pay provides
only a limited, last line of defense.229 In the class action context, by
contrast, the court is the first and last line of defense.230 While courts
are well equipped to resolve adversarial disputes, fee petitions in class
actions are typically unopposed by the settling defendant.23 1 And
objectors, as discussed above, are rare and often unconvincing. The
court is therefore left alone to determine the appropriate fee. If the
presiding judge grants the fees requested, she clears a case from her
docket, so the structural incentive is to acquiesce rather than to try and
determine the optimal fee award.232
Another important difference concerns when pay determinations are
made. Executive pay packages are always negotiated ex ante; class
counsel's fees, by contrast, are usually determined ex post.233 This
undermines their incentive-alignment function. To be sure, class action
attorneys know at the outset of the case that they will receive some
percentage of any settlement fund they create; but they do not know
exactly what that percentage will be.234 This uncertainty makes it
228 See supra Part II.B.1.
229 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
230 Securities class actions governed by the PSLRA are the notable exception. In these
cases, the lead plaintiff may negotiate class counsel's pay ex ante. See In re Cendant Corp.
Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2001). But see Lynn A. Baker, Michael A. Perino
& Charles Silver, Is the Price Right? An Empirical Study of Fee-Setting in Securities Class
Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371, 1380 (2015) [hereinafter Is the Price Right?]
(empirical study showing that in many securities class actions, attorneys' fees are still
set by the court ex post rather than negotiated by the lead plaintiff ex ante).
231 "Defendants are typically indifferent to fee awards because in a common fund
case, the fee is deducted from the settlement and therefore simply involves the allocation
of an already fixed sum between class counsel and class members." Baker et al., supra
note 230, at 1387.
232 Empirical studies show that courts grant the fees requested approximately 78%
of the time. Eisenberg et al., supra note 221, at 953.
233 But see supra note 230.
234 See William J. Lynk, The Courts and the Plaintiffs' Bar: Awarding the Attorney's Fee
in Class-Action Litigation, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 185, 191 (1994) ("T]he plaintiffs lawyer
will infer an implicit contract governing how his fee will likely be computed, an
inference presumably based on the history of ex post fee awards in comparable cases.").
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difficult for them to determine the optimal amount to invest in the
case.235 By increasing the risk that they face, it also exacerbates the
perverse settlement tendencies discussed below.236
The timing of the fee determination also affects the perspective of the
fee setter. When setting fees ex ante, the focus of the corporate board is
directed toward the incentive effects of the fee arrangement. When
setting counsel fees ex post, courts are more likely to focus on
distributional effects.237 Even if courts do consider incentive effects,
hindsight bias is likely to lead them to underestimate the risk assumed
by class counsel in litigating the case if a large recovery is actually
obtained.238 Either of these tendencies could help explain why courts
reduce the fee percentage awarded the higher the recovery, despite the
fact that - as explained below - theory suggests this is precisely the
wrong thing to do.239
Empirical studies indicate that the average and median percentage awarded hovers
around 25%, but there is considerable variance. Eisenberg et al., supra note 221, at 947;
see Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards,
supra note 38, at 833.
235 See Lynn A. Baker, Michael A. Perino & Charles Silver, Setting Attorneys' Fees in
Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Assessment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1677, 1715 ("[I] t is
reasonable to expect that lawyers will make better decisions throughout a litigation
when fee terms are clear than when they can only guess what they will earn .... ");
Lynk, supra note 234, at 194 ("Counsel for the plaintiff class cannot invest rationally in
a case without some idea of how the pie is to be divided if they win.").
236 See Baker et al., Is the Price Right?, supra note 230, at 1441 ("Leaving the core fee
term unsettled creates uncertainty about compensation, causing lawyers to decline
some risks that clients would rationally want them to take. The predictable result will
be suboptimal recoveries that leave clients and lawyers poorer than they might have
been.").
237 Id. at 1440 (observing that courts are more likely to view fee setting as zero sum
game because the legal services have already been provided); Bruce L. Hay, The Theory
of Fee Regulation in Class Action Settlements, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1429, 1434 (1997)
(observing that courts ask "in essence, whether a fee award represents a fair
distributional share of the amount obtained, taking the settlement amount as given,"
when they should "ask how counsel's anticipated fee determines her settlement
demands").
238 See Baker et al., Is the Price Right?, supra note 230, at 1441 (observing that ex post
judicial fee setting "creates significant potential for the hindsight bias to poison judges'
assessments of litigation risk" with the "predictable result ... that fee percentages will
be set too low").
239 See Eisenberg & Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements,
supra note 221, at 263-65 (documenting the existence of a scaling effect, in which the
fee percent decreases as the class recovery increases). A difference in the percentages
awarded in cases involving large potential damages and in cases involving small
potential damages may be warranted because "in light of the economies of scale of class
litigation, courts might be able to induce class counsel to bring large class actions at
lower percentages than small class actions." Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make
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Fee awards in class actions also differ from executive pay packages in
composition. The anticipation of being paid a percentage of any
eventual recovery in a class action is akin to a corporate executive being
paid entirely in restricted stock that vests at retirement. Executive pay
packages are more multifaceted than this, and for good reason: this sort
of compensation arrangement would dramatically increase the risk
preference misalignment that already exists between executives and
diversified shareholders by virtue of the significant investment of
human and reputational capital executives make in their companies.240
Stock options, for example, are an important component of executive
pay at public companies. Stock options encourage executives to take
risks they might otherwise avoid - risks that shareholders would want
them to take - because options pay off only on the upside.241 In class
actions, by contrast, there is no option component o class counsel pay
that would help to align class counsel's risk preferences with those of
the class. This means that when confronted with the choice of taking a
sure thing settlement or threatening trial unless the defendant pays
more, class counsel will be more inclined to take the safe path than class
members would prefer.
If class action attorneys were awarded higher percentage shares of the
recovery as the amount of the recovery increased, it would help to
mitigate this risk preference misalignment by making upside payoffs
relatively more valuable to them. Rising marginal contingency fees also
help with a distinct problem: class action attorneys often face
diminishing returns to effort. That is, the "last dollars of recovery are
generally the most costly to produce."242 This means that class action
attorneys "may have reduced incentives to seek higher recoveries
because of the increased probability that [their] costs will exceed [their]
marginal return."243  This problem, like the risk preference
misalignment problem, creates an incentive for class action attorneys to
accept lower settlements than the class would prefer. But despite the
virtues of rising marginal contingency fees, courts do not award them.
To the contrary, as noted above they seem to do exactly the opposite,
awarding smaller percentages the higher the recovery.244
Too Little?, supra note 28, at 2066. But, within a case, scaling the percentage downward
as the recovery increases is problematic for the reasons discussed infra.
24o See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
241 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
242 Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block, supra note 206, at 678.
243 Niebler, supra note 221, at 789.
244 See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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In addition to restricted stock and stock options, executive
compensation packages also typically include a cash salary, and
executives have the ability to cash out their equity grants periodically
as they vest.245 They can use this cash to diversify. Class action
attorneys, by contrast, are paid nothing from the class unless and until
a settlement is achieved. And ethical rules limit the ability of class action
attorneys to cash out part of their investment in the case early in order
to diversify. Class counsel can bring in co-counsel to help fund the
litigation in exchange for a portion of the fees, and they can seek to
diversify by acting as co-counsel in other cases on similar terms, but
they cannot sell part of their anticipated contingency fee for cash to a
third party.246
B. Governance Strategies
Whereas governance strategies have always been utilized in public
companies, they are non-existent in class actions. Class members do not
vote to elect their class "representative," nor do they vote on whether
to accept a settlement, or on anything at all. Public company
shareholders, by contrast, vote to elect the members of the board of
directors. They also vote on, inter alia, whether to approve a sale of the
corporation or substantially all of its assets.247 To be sure, governance
rights in the public company setting have been hampered by the lack of
a universal proxy ballot, the expense of running a competing proxy
solicitation, and general collective action problems.248 But courts,
regulators, and shareholder advocates nevertheless preciously guard the
shareholder franchise. As the Delaware Supreme Court has explained,
"whether the vote is seen functionally as an unimportant formalism, or
as an important tool of discipline, it is clear that it is critical to the theory
that legitimates the exercise of power by some (directors and officers)
over vast aggregations of property that they do not own."249
245 See TONELLO ET AL., supra note 102, at 124-26, figs.4.15 & 4.16.
246 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020). But see Brian
T. Fitzpatrick, Can and Should the New Third-Party Litigation Financing Come to Class
Actions?, 19 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 109, 117 (2018) [hereinafter Can and Should the
New Third-Party] (discussing ways that class action attorneys presently skirt these
rules); Anthony J. Sebok, Selling Attorney's Fees, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207, 1252-53
(2018) (arguing that this is an incorrect reading of the ethical rules).
247 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (2020); see also supra note 139 and
accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
249 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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Class action scholars, by contrast, have largely accepted the lack of
class member governance rights as inevitable. While some have
suggested techniques for sampling the viewpoints of class members,250
I am unaware of any proposal recommending a full class member vote
on key issues like the identity of the class representative or settlement
approval. Rather, the consensus is that costs combined with rational
apathy and other collective action problems make class member voting
nonsensical in small claims class actions.25 1
This is likely true under current practice. As noted in Part I, class
actions lack any supporting infrastructure that would help to reduce the
costs of communicating with class members or processing their votes.
And given the dismal number of class members who even bother to
submit claims forms, it is difficult to imagine that many would make
the effort to read, complete and return a ballot.
C. Regulatory Strategies
Recall that regulatory strategies are enforced by authorities external
to the agency relationship and take two forms: agent constraints,
represented by rules and standards that govern the behavior of the agent
during the course of the agency relationship, and affiliation terms,
which regulate agent entry into and principal exit from that
250 See, e.g., Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
1939, 1962 (2010). To the extent that these proposals are meant to address intra-class
conflicts, they are not immediately relevant o this Article, which as explained in note
36, supra, is focused on class actions possessing a large degree of class member
homogeneity and cohesion. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 198, at 197 n.130 ("Some
commentators have explored the possibility of using surveys of absent class members
or 'town meetings' as a means to insure that conflicting views within the class are
brought to class counsel's attention."); cf. Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class
Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982) (discussing pluralistic and majoritarian
techniques for assessing class member views in class actions seeking structural reform).
251 See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability, supra note 6, at 417 ("Small
claimants have little incentive to vote. Thus, not only will these small claimants be hard
to identify or contact, but they have little reason to respond to any solicitation.");
Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, supra note 6, at 373
("[I]t is difficult to avoid skepticism in the face of strategies to police class actions that
require greater individual oversight . . . through participation."); Issacharoff, The
Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, supra note 7, at 3182 (noting "there are
generally massive transaction problems with even putatively engaging the participants,
so that surveying the class, elections, and periodic review are all not often meaningfully
available"); Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, supra note 7, at
104-05 (discussing problems with class member voting, including "the natural apathy
of the class members with small stakes in the litigation and the cost of voting
mechanisms as well as voter education").
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relationship.252 Whereas in the public company context agent
constraints play at most a supporting role, they are lead actor in the
class action context. Conversely, affiliation terms - specifically the free
transferability of shares - play a hugely important role in the public
company context, but serve as only a trivial constraint on agency costs
in the class action setting.
1. Agent Constraints
Class actions rely more on agent constraints than any other agency-
cost-reduction strategy.253 Rule 23 seeks to protect class members'
interests by requiring judicial approval of any settlement and
authorizing the court to award only "reasonable" attorneys' fees to class
counsel.254 To approve a settlement, the court must determine that it is
"fair, reasonable, and adequate," after providing notice and an
opportunity to object to class members and holding a hearing.255 The
procedure for awarding fees is similar to that for approving a settlement:
class counsel files a petition with the court requesting a certain fee
award (typically framed as a percentage of the class recovery), class
members are notified and given an opportunity to object, and a hearing
may be held (in conjunction with the settlement hearing or subsequent
thereto).256 The court may grant the fees requested if it determines them
to be reasonable or award a different amount.
Public company sales and executive compensation packages are
similarly subject to judicial oversight, but only as a backstop. For
example, fiduciary duty suits challenging executive pay are dismissed
unless the plaintiff pleads facts suggesting that the compensation
constituted "corporate waste," i.e., "an exchange ... so one sided that
no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that
the corporation has received adequate consideration."257 This is an
252 See supra Part IIA.
253 As discussed above, I use of the percentage-of-the-recovery method of
determining attorneys' fees (a rewards strategy) is a very important tool for aligning the
interests of class counsel with those of the class. But it is implemented through the court
and in this way is embedded within, and dependent upon, an agent constraint. See supra
note 221 and accompanying text.
254 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), (h).
255 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (outlining factors that courts must consider when
approving a settlement); see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §
21.634 (4th ed. 2004) (describing the fairness hearing).
256 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 255 § 21.71-21.726
(describing the procedure for reviewing fee requests).
257 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000).
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incredibly high burden in practice, and reflects a judicial determination
that executive pay is better policed through other agency-cost-reduction
techniques, such as trusteeship.258 Similarly, courts have devised ways
to dismiss suits challenging corporate sales if other agency-cost-
reduction techniques were utilized in the negotiation and approval of
the deal.259
At first blush, the heavier reliance placed on agent constraints in the
class action setting appears justified: judges are more competent to
evaluate settlement agreements and fee petitions than the terms of a
corporate sale or executive compensation package, and they are natural
candidates to do so, given that they are already involved in overseeing
the case. But unlike courts deciding fiduciary duty claims, courts
reviewing class action settlements and fee petitions operate without the
benefit of the adversarial process: the defendant stands arm-in-arm with
class counsel in seeking approval of the settlement and has no reason to
contest fees that will be paid from the class's recovery. In the absence of
opposition, the court will be inclined to approve the parties' request,
since doing so comports not only with the interests of the lawyers before
the court but also with the court's own interest in docket clearing.260
While objectors could inject some adversarialness into the settlement
and fee-approval process, as discussed above objectors are rare and
often incredible. It is also the case that courts preliminarily approve a
proposed settlement before notifying class members and holding a
hearing.26 1 The purpose of preliminary approval is to avoid the
substantial costs associated with providing notice to class members
unless the settlement is likely to be approved, but the practical effect is
258 One former Chancellor of the Delaware Chancery court wrote that "the
likelihood of the existence of a case that would 'meet the legal standard of waste' was
about as likely as the existence of the Loch Ness Monster." Thomas & Wells, supra note
111, at 874.
259 See supra Part II.B.3.a.
260 Judges' reputational interests in being perceived as fair may not adequately
counteract these incentives, because they do not face significant public scrutiny with
respect to their decisions approving class action settlements and fee petitions. See
Koniak & Cohen, supra note 211, at 1125-27. The decisions of the Delaware Chancery
Court in cases alleging breach of fiduciary duty by public company officials, by contrast,
are closely scrutinized by both the corporate bar and the financial press. See, e.g., Faith
Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware's Stake in Corporate
Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 60 (2009) (describing Delaware corporate law's
"extraordinary respect and prestige" and noting that "[l]itigation involving powerful,
Delaware-incorporated companies fills the docket of the Delaware Court of Chancery
... and the cover pages of The Wall Street Journal").
261 This longstanding practice became a Rule 23 requirement as part of recent
amendments to the rule. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B).
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to weaken further the potential influence of objectors, because the court
will be predisposed to affirm its preliminary assessment of the
settlement's fairness.
For these reasons, the broad academic consensus is that Rule 23's
requirement for court approval of settlements and attorneys' fees is an
ineffective check on class action agency costs.262 The agent constraints
applicable to class counsel that originate outside of Rule 23 - such as
Rule 11 sanctions (and state court analogues), various rules of
professional responsibility, malpractice liability, and the specter of a
collateral attack on a class settlement - hold even less promise: courts
very rarely choose to impose Rule 11 sanctions, and class action agency
costs are unlikely to manifest in conduct that would warrant such
sanctions in any event263; the likelihood that a state bar association
would detect and prosecute ethical violations is also extremely low264;
malpractice claims against class counsel are rare265; and the prospect of
a successful collateral attack on a class settlement is far too remote to
have a meaningful disciplining influence.266
262 See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 215, at 405-06, 406 n.16 (including sources cited
therein); Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of
Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 58 (2001); Koniak &
Cohen, supra note 211, at 1104; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'
Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 44-50 (1991); Rubenstein, supra note
191, at 1444-46; Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and
Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 423, 432-34 (1993); Weiss &
Beckerman, supra note 202, at 2057. As an empirical matter, courts approve fee requests
with little or no modification in the vast majority of cases, and only very rarely
disapprove class action settlements. See, e.g., Eisenberg et al., supra note 221, at 953.
263 Rule 11 punishes the assertion of frivolous claims and defenses and does not
directly police attorney fidelity toward their client. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
264 See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 202, at 2065 ("The rules governing attorneys'
professional conduct . . . do not effectively constrain plaintiffs' attorneys in class
actions.").
265 See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State
Courts in Class Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 253
n.122 (identifying obstacles to suing class counsel for malpractice after a class
settlement has been approved). See generally Koniak & Cohen, supra note 211 (arguing
for increased use of malpractice suits as a means to discipline class counsel).
266 For the challenges involved in collaterally attacking a class settlement, see Kahan
& Silberman, supra note 265, at 262-64, and see also Rubenstein, supra note 191, at
1437 n.4 (collecting articles on point).
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2. Affiliation Terms
The free transferability of shares is an exit-based affiliation term that,
as previously discussed, plays a vital role in helping to constrain agency
costs in the public company setting.267 It has no analogue in the context
of small claims class actions, given that class members have no practical
ability to sell their class claims to third parties on a secondary market.
Class members do have the ability to opt-out of the class at the time it
is certified, and they are often given another chance to opt out at the
time of settlement.268 But the opt-out right is illusory in class actions
involving small claims because to act on it would be economically
irrational. Staying in the class holds out the possibility of receiving some
recovery, however inadequate. To recover anything after opting out
would require pursuing individual litigation, the cost of which would
vastly exceed the value of any class member's claim.269 So, in reality,
small claims class members have no exit rights at all.
Entry-based affiliation terms play only a modest role in small claims
class actions. Like all attorneys, class counsel must be licensed to
practice law, for example. This implies both a basic level of competency
and ensures that class counsel has been exposed to the inculcation of
professional ethical norms that begins in law school. Class counsel must
also be appointed by the court, and Rule 23 instructs that the court may
only appoint "adequate" applicants.270 Rule 23 sets forth a laundry list
of factors that the court is instructed to consider in determining
adequacy,271 but the perception is that, at least in class actions where
multiple applicants are not vying for the position of lead counsel,
"courts do not take the adequacy inquiry very seriously and virtually
always presumptively ratify whomever 'steps up to the plate."'272 In the
small subset of class actions where applicants do compete for
267 See supra Part II.B.1.b.
268 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v), (e)(4).
269 See, e.g., Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an
Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85, 144 (1997)
("Although claimants have a theoretical right to opt out, they have no practical ability
to do so."). If class members did utilize their opt out rights in large numbers, it would
have a destabilizing effect -just like abandoning capital lock-in would destabilize the
corporate form. Cf. David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class
Actions: Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 24 (arguing that use of opt-out
is "detrimental to the welfare of individuals in need of insurance supplied by civil
liability recoveries").
270 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2).
271 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1).
272 Mullenix, supra note 195, at 1701.
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appointment as class counsel,273 some valuable judicial screening may
occur, although unlike the corporate board of directors searching for a
CEO, the judge will have only a small, self-selected set of candidates to
choose from.274
Class counsel is also subject to narrow disclosure requirements.
Specifically, Rule 23 requires class counsel to provide class members
with notice of the certification and their right to opt out, notice of any
proposed settlement that has been preliminarily approved by the court,
and with notice of a petition for attorneys' fees.275 Class counsel is also
required by the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") to notify certain
government actors of a proposed settlement at least ninety days prior to
final approval.276 Recall that in the public company context, disclosure
does important work by supporting the other agency-cost-reduction
techniques utilized277; its role in the class action setting is naturally
more limited, because there are far fewer other agency-cost-reduction
tools to support. Whereas disclosure can aid in the exercise of
shareholders governance rights, for example, class members cannot do
anything with the information provided to them by class counsel except
opt-out or object - neither of which will be economically rational in a
case involving small claims.278 Government actors informed of a
pending settlement, by contrast, might be provoked to object. In this
way, CAFA's notice provision lends support to the trusteeship strategy.
273 In non-securities cases where multiple complaints have been filed and
consolidated before a single judge, competing candidates for class counsel may emerge.
Most commonly, however, the various lawyers will agree on who will serve as lead
counsel (with the non-selected counsel promised a share of the legal work and fees),
and the judge will defer to their choice. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 255, § 21.272, at
279. In securities class actions, the court will typically defer to the lead plaintiffs' choice
of lead counsel. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
274 Some courts have experimented with a competitive bidding approach, which
entails "inviting applicants for appointment as class counsel to submit competing bids."
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 255, § 21.272, at 280. But the auction approach to
selecting lead counsel has been subject to significant criticism and is uncommon today.
275 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (notice of certification and right to opt out),
23(e)(1) (notice of settlement), 23(h)(1) (notice of motion for attorneys' fees). Notice
is also constitutionally required. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812-
13 (1985).
276 See 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2018).
277 See supra Part II.B.
278 See supra notes 211 & 269 and accompanying text.
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IV. PUBLIC-COMPANY INSPIRED CLASS ACTION REFORMS
The exercise of comparing the governance techniques used in public
companies to those used in class actions inspires several interesting
reform proposals. Some of these proposals build on old ideas, others are
entirely novel. Most are grouped below according to where they fit in
the ACL taxonomy. But one exists outside that taxonomy. I begin with
this reform, as it provides a foundation for several of the reform ideas
that follow.
A. Build a Supporting Infrastructure: Classaction.gov
As explained earlier, a market infrastructure lends critical support to
public companies' agency-cost-reduction efforts.279  Mandatory
disclosure is meaningful because investors and analysts can freely and
easily access public companies' SEC filings via the SEC's EDGAR
database. Share depository institutions and firms specializing in proxy
administrative functions facilitate shareholder voting. The free
transferability of shares produces the myriad benefits it does because
organized exchanges, clearinghouses and share depository institutions
make secondary trading cheap and easy. Without this infrastructure,
transaction costs would render the use of these tools inefficient, or at
least vastly less efficient than it is today.280
Class actions have no similar supporting infrastructure. There is no
centralized database of class action filings, for example, that
government actors and other interested parties can freely and easily
search in order to identify class actions to monitor and, when
appropriate, serve as an objector in.281 Nor is there a central repository
that tracks potential class members and provides an efficient method for
identifying and communicating with them. In many types of cases, such
279 See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
280 This is not to suggest that capital market infrastructure cannot be improved,
particularly with respect to shareholder voting. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
281 Past calls for the creation of such a database have gone unheeded. See, e.g.,
DEBORAH R. HENSLER, BONNIE DOMBEY-MOORE, BETH GIDDENS, JENNIFER GROSS, ERIK K.
MOLLER & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS:
PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 36-37 (1999) (recommending comprehensive
reporting of class action litigation); Robert H. Klonoff, Mark Herrmann & Bradley W.
Harrison, Making Class Actions Work: The Untapped Potential of the Internet, 69 U. PITT.
L. REV. 727, 755-57 (2008) (noting the benefits of a class action litigation database);
Nicholas M. Pace & William B. Rubenstein, How Transparent Are Class Action
Outcomes?: Empirical Research on the Availability of Class Action Claims Data 44 (Rand
Inst. for Civil Justice, Working Paper No. WR-599-ICJ, 2008) (advocating for a "central
repository for class action outcomes").
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as those brought on behalf of purchasers of small consumer products,
locating class members is extremely difficult, 282 requiring resort to
(usually ineffective) publication notice campaigns.283  Providing
individual notice to those class members who can be located, as is
required by Rule 23 and due process, is also very costly. A class member
with a $5 claim would see nearly 10% of her recovery consumed by a
single postage stamp. She will see considerably more consumed by the
expense of processing her claim and distributing her settlement funds
- if she even responds to the notices she receives, as class members are
highly likely to disregard class action notices as junk mail.284 Finally,
no platform exists that would allow class members to easily sell their
class claims to a third party.
The class action website and supporting administration that I describe
in Classaction.gov would provide the backbone of this missing
infrastructure.285 Imagine if the federal government, after a broad and
effective publicity campaign, required persons to register on a
government-run website in order to participate in any future class
actions. Registrants would be required to provide basic information
about themselves (e.g., name, phone number, email, and physical
addresses), which would allow for the creation of a secure database that
could be searched to identify potential class members in particular
cases. To alert class members who were not identified as a result of the
database search, notices could also be posted on the website and
emailed to registrants who had opted to receive such communications;
these class members could then self-identify via the website. All
communications with class members could be sent by emails
originating from a trustworthy @Classaction.gov email address and
would be presented in a uniform, easy-to-digest format. Settlement
funds would be escrowed with the federal government and then
deposited electronically into the accounts specified by eligible class
members. Every case would also have a dedicated page on the website
where court filings and other important information would be posted
282 See Rose, supra note 26, at 26-27.
283 In a recent study of class action settlements, the claims rates in cases when
publication notice was used as a supplement to direct notice were not different from the
claims rates when direct notice was used alone, suggesting that publication notice is
generally ineffective. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, CONSUMERS AND CLASS ACTIONS: A
RETROSPECTIVE AND ANALYSIS OF SETTLEMENT CAMPAIGNS 11 (2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/consumers-class-actions-retrospective-analysis-settlement-
campaigns [https://perma.cc/9WW8-XFFC].
284 See id. (reporting that the median percentage of direct notice recipients who made
claims in the cases studied was 9% and the weighted mean was 4%).
285 See generally Rose, supra note 26.
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in a standardized format, and where opt-outs and claims forms could be
submitted and objections lodged. Actual settlement distribution data
would be made publicly available on the case's webpage. Court filings
and settlement distribution data would also be fed into a
comprehensive, searchable class action database that would be made
freely available to scholars and the general public.
Classaction.gov promises to dramatically improve class action
practice, separate and apart from its ability to support the reforms
suggested in this Article. Among other things, it could (1) meaningfully
increase the number of class members that actually receive notice and
share in settlement funds; (2) reduce the costs associated with notice
and claims administration, leaving more money on the table for class
members; and (3) render class actions transparent, allowing researchers
and the public to intelligently assess their value in our society. For a
fulsome discussion of these benefits, as well as a detailed description
and defense of the basic idea, I refer readers to Classaction.gov. I do not
rehash the same arguments here. Instead, in the subparts that follow I
discuss how the website and supporting administration described in
Classaction.gov and sketched out above could be built upon to facilitate
some of the public-company inspired reforms proposed in this Article.
B. Incentive Alignment-Based Reforms
The public company analogy both (1) suggests ways that trusteeship
strategies might be introduced into class action practice and
(2) highlights how the rewards strategy currently employed in class
actions might be improved.
1. Trusteeship
a. Create an Independent Class Oversight Position with Authority
More Akin to a Public Company Board
As previously explained, the class representative makes for a very
poor trustee.286 Because it is selected by class counsel, the class
representative's loyalties run not to the residual claimants of the
enterprise - the class members - but to the very agent it is meant to
supervise. Moreover, the class representative lacks authority to actually
control any aspect of the litigation. In these ways, it is very different
from the public company board. The public company board is elected
by shareholders and possesses ultimate authority over corporate affairs;
286 See supra Part III.A.I.
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the loyalty of directors to shareholders is further bolstered by
independence requirements. Securities class actions come closer to
mimicking the public company board model, by encouraging
institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiffs and granting lead
plaintiffs authority over counsel selection and compensation. But this
approach is not easily translatable to small claims class actions due to
the lack of large stakes, sophisticated class members.
A trusteeship position more akin to the public company board could
be created for small claims class actions, however, if persons other than
class members were permitted to serve in the role. There is no
requirement that public company directors be shareholders, and
creating a similarly liberalized class action oversight position - to be
filled by third parties whose motivations, like independent directors, are
reputation based - is an intriguing idea.287 Public company boards are
typically multi-member institutions, but given the lesser complexity
and smaller size of class actions, a single-member class overseer is
probably best.288 Candidates for the position might include government
officials, non-profit organizations, academics and law school clinics.
The only strict requirement should be the independence of the overseer
from class counsel and the defendant.289
Jean Wegman Burns has similarly recommended that the class
representative position be replaced with one that need not be staffed by
a class member, recognizing that "[i]n many cases, the most effective
monitor may be a nonmember organization with a special interest in the
subject matter of the lawsuit." 290 But Burns envisioned that the new
287 If necessary, a traditional class representative could be selected to satisfy
constitutional standing requirements and to submit to discovery demands, but without
monitoring expectations. Cf. Burns, supra note 198, at 192-200 (suggesting that
"exemplary class members" could be used for such purposes).
288 The use of lead plaintiff groups in the securities class action setting has been
subject to critique. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 262, at 69-78 (noting the cons of using a
lead plaintiff group). But see Burch, supra note 4, at 1155-60 (discussing the benefits of
small and cognitively diverse lead-plaintiff groups).
289 The class overseer should have no material financial or familial relationship with
class counsel or the defendant. The class overseer's past use of class counsel in other
legal matters should not, however, be disqualifying if the class overseer paid standard
rates for the legal services received. Other eligibility criteria might include the absence
of criminal history, the absence of any court or administrative finding of unethical or
dishonest conduct in the past ten years, and compliance with required disclosures. To
be sure, this will not ensure perfect interest alignment, but that is an impossible ideal.
Cf. Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State
Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 511-30 (2012) (exploring the agency costs
and other problems that can arise in parens patriae actions).
290 Burns, supra note 198, at 196.
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position would be filled in the same manner as the class representative
position is under current practice: with a candidate proposed by class
counsel and approved by the court.291 To ensure true independence, it
is critical that the class overseer not be selected by counsel. Ideally,
candidates for the position would be elected by class members via a class
member vote. This would legitimize the overseer and tie its allegiance
to the class, in a similar way as shareholder elections legitimize the
corporate board and tie its allegiance to shareholders.292 As discussed
below in the subpart on governance-based reforms, cost and rational
apathy concerns need not doom class member appointment rights if the
election process is smartly designed and executed via the
Classaction.gov website.
The improved loyalties and greater sophistication the envisioned class
overseers would possess, relative to class representatives under current
practice, might justify granting them greater authority. Like the public
company board vis-a-vis the corporate enterprise, class overseers could
be given real decision control over the management of the class action.
They could, like the lead plaintiff in a securities class action, be granted
authority to select class counsel and negotiate the terms of
compensation, subject to deferential judicial review.293 Their support
could also ordinarily be required for a settlement advanced by class
291 See id.
292 Unlike corporate directors, who typically must secure reelection annually, class
overseers would not face reelection pressure within the case. Once elected, they would
serve for the life of the class action. But if class overseers wished to serve the role again
in future class actions, anticipated future elections may play a similar disciplining
function. This assumes, of course, that the reputation of candidates will matter to
election outcomes. Part IV.C identifies ways to ensure that this is, in fact, the case. Cf.
Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: Kalven & Rosenfield
Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 645-46 (2008) (similarly observing that if courts
considered class counsel's reputation in the counsel selection process, it would help to
address the legitimacy problem that arises due to the one-shot nature of class
representation).
293 The court's decision on a certification motion would precede the election of class
overseer, as might the court's decision on certain other motions. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
supra note 255, § 21.133, at 253 (explaining that the court may, and often should, rule
on motions pursuant to Rule 12, Rule 56, or other threshold issues before deciding on
certification; such rulings bind only the named parties). Two things follow from this.
First, these motions would need to be handled on behalf of the putative class by interim
counsel - either the attorney who filed the putative class complaint (if only one
complaint has been filed) or interim counsel selected by the court (if multiple
complaints have been filed). Such counsel should be entitled to compensation for its
efforts from any subsequent settlement fund, even if not retained as class counsel by the
class overseer. Second, all settlement discussions would need to be delayed until after
the class was certified, the class overseer elected, and class counsel selected.
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counsel to be presented to the court for approval, just like board support
of a corporate sale proposed by executives is required before it can be
presented for a shareholder vote. To protect the class and class counsel
from the whims of a rogue class overseer who would use this power to
force a trial when it is not in the class' best interest, the court might be
permitted to approve a settlement over the class overseer's head, but
only if class counsel satisfies a high burden.
To prevent corruption of the counsel appointment process, rules
prohibiting pay-to-play arrangements would need to be adopted. SEC
Rule 206(4)-5 and Rule G-37 of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board provide a possible model. These rules, among other things,
prohibit government clients from hiring investment advisors and
municipal advisors, respectively, if the advisors or their employees have
made a financial contribution to the organization or those who control
it in the past two years.294 A class overseer could similarly be forbidden
from hiring as class counsel any firm that has, or whose members have,
made campaign or charitable contributions to the overseer or those who
control it for a designated period of time.295 If the class overseer is a
professor, she could similarly be forbidden from hiring firms that have
retained her as an expert witness or consultant in that timeframe.
One might question whether reputable non-class members would
volunteer to be candidates for class overseer, given the failure of
government actors and non-profits to lodge objections with any
regularity under current practice. There are several reasons to believe
that these actors would be more interested in the class overseer
position.296
First, objectors usually go uncompensated for their efforts,297 and
government actors and non-profits are resource constrained. Calls to
increase objector funding have been criticized because they risk
294 See SEC Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-5 (2020); MUN.
SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE BOOK, Rule G-37, at 298 (2019).
295 Professors Cox and Thomas have similarly recommended a ban modeled on Rule
G-37 be adopted to curb pay-to-play practices between class counsel and public pension
funds in securities class actions. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 204, at 1614-15.
296 Like independent directors on a public company board, class overseers should
enjoy broad immunity from liability for breaches of the duty of care so as to encourage
service and risk-taking. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
297 Courts may award attorneys' fees to objectors' counsel. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h)
(advisory committee's note to 2003 amendment). But this is rare and does not
compensate the objector for their time and effort, as distinct from their attorney's. See
Bruce D. Greenberg, Keeping the Flies Out of the Ointment: Restricting Objectors to Class
Action Settlements, 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 949, 987 (2010) (observing that "[f]ee awards
to class action objectors are 'few and far between"').
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encouraging frivolous objections.298 Class overseers, by contrast, could
be offered incentive payments for their service without raising similar
concerns. Such payments would need to be significant enough to make
it rational for them to assume the role, but not so high as to alter their
primary, reputation-based motivation for doing so. The monetary fund
created by a settlement or trial judgment is an obvious source for this
payment. If it were the only source, however, the class overseer would,
like class counsel, have an incentive to favor a sure thing settlement
over a risky trial, even when it would be in class members' best interest
to pursue the latter. To be sure, the misalignment of interest in this
regard would be less dramatic with respect to the class overseer than
with respect to class counsel, given that the class overseer would have
less at risk financially if the case lost at trial and more at risk
reputationally if it sold out the class.299 But the misalignment would
exist. An alternative funding source for incentive payments in cases that
do not produce a monetary recovery should therefore be identified.300
A requirement that plaintiffs' counsel post a bond to cover the class
overseer's incentive payment in the event no monetary recovery is
achieved is one possibility; 301 others could be devised.30 2
A second reason that organizations that have not lodged objections in
class actions with any regularity might be more willing to serve as class
overseers concerns impact. Objectors have very limited influence over
the court's determination whether to approve a settlement or grant a fee
petition. The class overseer, by contrast, would have real power to shape
the progress of the litigation and influence the terms of the settlement.
This should make the position more attractive to entities looking to do
maximum good with limited resources.
298 See, e.g., Koniak & Cohen, supra note 211, at 1108-09 (noting obstacles when
objectors are used).
299 See Klement, supra note 3, at 63 (noting that, "[c]ompared to litigating a class
action, monitoring is much cheaper and easier to perform;" "[p]eriodical examination
of relevant files and records, constant communication with the class attorney, and
consistent participation in settlement conferences and important hearings would often
suffice to supervise the class attorney").
300 Cf. Macey & Miller, supra note 262, at 48 (similarly observing that it would be
undesirable to pay a guardian ad litem through "a contingent interest in the settlement
fund, because this would create a perverse incentive for the guardian to support
settlements in order to assure a fee").
301 See Rubenstein, supra note 191, at 1456-57 (suggesting this funding mechanism
for objectors).
302 For example, a court-administered fund for this purpose could be created with
unclaimed settlement monies. See Sylvia R. Lazos, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action
Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MIcH. L.
REV. 308, 331 (1985) (suggesting funding mechanisms for guardian ad litems).
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Third, objectors under current practice face significant search
costs.303 Classaction.gov promises to vastly reduce the costs associated
with discovering cases of interest to particular organizations. Notice of
the opportunity to step forward as a class overseer candidate could be
emailed to potential class members along with the notice of the
certification; it could simultaneously be posted on Classaction.gov for
the public at large, and emailed to those persons and entities who have
requested to receive alerts when certification notices are issued.304 An
interested organization's search costs would therefore be reduced to
setting the appropriate alerts on Classaction.gov, reading the
certification notices that subsequently land in the organization's inbox,
and reading supporting case documents (freely available at a click of the
mouse on Classaction.gov) in the subset of cases deemed of interest to
the organization.
Fourth, because it is a more substantial role, the class overseer would
garner more publicity than objectors do. This may motivate politicians
looking to secure reelection, non-profits looking for funding, and
academics looking to increase their profile. This last point, however,
also suggests a potential weakness. While class actions alleging
egregious abuses on the part of the defendant may attract the attention
of many reputable class overseer candidates, other class actions may
attract less or even none - either because the underlying claims are of
dubious merit or simply are not salacious enough to attract attention.
It is difficult to predict how significant of a problem this would be.
There are thousands of law school professors in the United States, many
of whom might be willing to serve. And because it would be a
compensated position, it is possible that class oversight would become
a new niche legal specialty, drawing in private attorneys to fill any
shortage in supply.305 New law school clinics might also step in to fill
the void. But even if class overseer candidates did not emerge in every
case, it would not negate their value. That subset of cases could simply
revert to the current approach of relying on judicial oversight to protect
303 See Rose, supra note 26, at 22-23.
304 Class actions would be tagged on Classaction.gov by reference to various criteria,
such as subject matter (e.g., automotive), legal claims being asserted (e.g., products
liability), and the jurisdiction in which they are filed (e.g., California state court).
Registrants on the site could then, by reference to these tags, select the type of cases
with respect to which they want to receive alerts.
305 While such attorneys would be profit-driven, they would still be functioning as a
trustee because their ability to get elected to the position would depend on their reputation
for serving the interests of class members. See supra note 292; infra Part IV.C.
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the class's interests. Class members in these cases would therefore be no
worse off than they are today.
The possibility that bad class overseers would be elected must also be
addressed. If this happened, class members might find themselves worse
off than they would be under the status quo.306 Independence
requirements and pay-to-play prohibitions will not necessarily weed out
incompetent class overseers, nor will they weed out class overseers
whose interests are antithetical to the class due to some ideological
conflict of interest (such as a hostility toward the substantive claims
being asserted or to class actions in general). As discussed infra, the
election process - if designed well - could go a long way to prevent
the election of such candidates. Disclosure rules, for example, could
operate to reveal incompetencies and ideological conflicts, making it
less likely that these candidates would secure significant votes. To
prevent anomalous outcomes in elections where all of the candidates
are undesirable, class members could always be given the option of
voting for judicial oversight in lieu of any class overseer candidate.
Moreover, judicial oversight could be the default for cases in which no
candidate hits a minimum vote threshold or quorum requirements are
not met.
A distinct concern is that the class overseer would be too effective in
advancing the interests of the class. This Article is in dialogue with the
class action literature focused on reducing agency costs in class actions;
another important strain of class action literature focuses on the
potential for the class device to distort, or exacerbate underlying defects
in, the substantive law, leading to over-deterrence.307 A reputationally-
motivated class overseer might take over-deterrence concerns into
account in exercising their oversight responsibilities. For example, a
consumer advocacy organization might be sensitive to the impact of
class action litigation on consumer prices when considering settlement
decisions. But one might fear that class overseers would instead use
their authority to push the boundaries of the law to achieve the highest
possible recovery for the class. While this might be in the class' narrow
self-interest in the particular case, it may lead to social welfare losses.
While I am sensitive to this concern,308 relying on the agency costs of
306 While the court should retain some discretion to disapprove counsel selection,
fee agreements and settlements approved by the class overseer, it should afford
substantial deference to the class overseer's choices.
307 See, e.g., Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 2 (discussing concerns about "blackmail"
settlements in class actions).
308 Indeed, I have written extensively on the over-deterrence potential of securities
fraud class actions. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC's New
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class actions to mitigate underlying problems with Rule 23 or the
substantive law is unsound. If class actions, vigorously pursued, are not
socially valuable, either in particular contexts or across the board, then
more targeted reforms are in order.
Many other countries rely on government actors or non-profits to
bring claims on behalf of consumers and other dispersed groups.309
While this proposal would similarly place reputationally-motivated
parties at the helm of small claims class actions in the United States, it
does not represent a radical shift toward a foreign model of aggregate
litigation. To the contrary, even if the class overseer reform were
adopted, the American class action would retain its exceptionalism.
Entrepreneurial lawyers would still initiate litigation in the hopes of
earning a contingency fee in opt-out litigation.310 They would simply be
subject, in most cases at least, to monitoring and control by a duly-
elected, reputationally-motivated class overseer - just as CEOs are
subject to monitoring and control by independent boards.311
Whistleblower Program Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1235, 1245-60 (2014); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform:
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule IOb-5, 108
CoLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1326-37 (2008); Amanda M. Rose, The Multi-Enforcer Approach
to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2183-84
(2010).
309 See, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously,
110 CoLUM. L. REV. 288, 302 (2010) (observing that "Europe has considerable
experience with representative actions brought by special entities, such as ombudsmen,
private consumer organizations, or other nonprofit associations that seek to enforce
particular statutes on behalf of consumers or others"); Ching-Ping Shao, Representative
Litigations in Corporate and Securities Laws by Government-Sanctioned Non-Profit
Organizations: Lessons from Taiwan, 15 AsIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL'Y J. 58, 60-61 (2013)
(describing the Taiwanese model for corporate and securities law claims, which relies
on suits initiated by a government-sponsored non-profit organization).
310 The class overseer would negotiate fees with the counsel it selects to represent
the class but would not be expected to pay the fee itself; the fee would therefore of
necessity remain contingent. In order to retain strong incentives for attorneys to initiate
class litigation, those who file suit but are not retained as class counsel by the class
overseer should be entitled to a judicially-determined contingency fee to compensate
them for their efforts.
311 The efficiencies that Classaction.gov would introduce would make opt-in class
actions a potentially viable alternative for claims aggregation. Cf. Coffee, Jr., supra note
309, at 305 (observing that changes in technology, such as websites and email, "make
the opt-in class more feasible than in the past"). Whether such a switch is desirable is
beyond the scope of this Article, however. The focus here is how to reduce class action
agency costs within the existing opt-out system.
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b. Encourage Input from Reputational Intermediaries
A more modest way to enhance reliance on trusteeship would be to
make objectors better reputational intermediaries. The focus should be
on encouraging greater participation by government actors and non-
profits, rather than class members. As explained supra, when class
members do object they fail to send a credible signal to the court given
that they lack a significant interest in the case - reputational or
financial.312 If claims transfer were allowed, as proposed infra, it is
possible that larger stakes class members would emerge whose views on
settlement might be more persuasive. Absent that, however,
encouraging greater input by government actors and non-profit
organizations is the more promising path. There are several potential
ways to achieve this.
First, to the extent that low participation is caused by the difficulty of
learning about pending cases and filing timely objections,
Classaction.gov would eliminate the problem. Greater input by
reputational intermediaries could also be encouraged if Rule 23 were
amended to require courts to adjust the level of scrutiny they apply to
proposed settlements and fee petitions depending on whether positive
input has been received by the government agency required to be
notified under CAFA.313 This might encourage class counsel to seek out
such approval and, perhaps, to act more faithfully to the class in
anticipation of the need to do so.314 Analogously, in the public company
setting courts adjust the level of scrutiny applied to certain conflicted
transactions depending on whether those transactions were approved
by independent directors, thereby encouraging reliance on trusteeship.
If government agencies indicated an inability or unwillingness to
provide input at the levels that might be requested of them, Rule 23
could instead be amended to require that the court appoint a guardian
ad litem to opine on class action settlements and fee petitions, with the
guardian's endorsement (or lack thereof) affecting the level of judicial
312 See supra Part III.A.1.
313 Cf. Lahav, Fundamental Principles, supra note 7, at 138 (suggesting that the
standard of review applied in appeals of class action settlements should be influenced
by the level of protections afforded class members in the trial court).
314 To prevent corruption of this process, the same sort of independence
requirements and pay-to-play prohibitions discussed in connection with the class
overseer reform should be considered in this context as well. See supra notes 289 & 294
and accompanying text. At minimum, a government actor endorsing a proposed
settlement should be required to disclose any promises or payments that it, or those
who control it, have received from class counsel, so that the court can discount the
endorsement as appropriate.
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scrutiny applied. This would ensure that at least one independent third
party weighed in.
Many commentators have urged greater use of guardians ad litem as
a way to help protect the interests of the class.315 The fact that courts
rarely choose to appoint guardians, despite having the authority to do
so, highlights a major limitation of strategies that foster input by
reputational intermediaries, while still leaving control in the hands of
the court.316 Such strategies will only make a difference if the court
values the input received. As explained supra, courts may devalue such
input because they are structurally biased in favor of settlement.317
Courts may also devalue input on settlements and fees because
objectors and court-appointed guardians ad litem rarely have access to
information that the court does not. By contrast, independent directors
involved in negotiating a conflicted transaction clearly stand in a better
315 See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 215, at 464-71 (showing enthusiasm for use of
guardians but warning that they need to be appointed early in the process and afforded
access to necessary information); Eric D. Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication
Ends? We'll Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23 Into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1773, 1796 (1997) ("The appointment of a guardian ad litem, whose only duty
is to review the proposed settlement on behalf of the class and advise the court on its
fairness, reasonableness and adequacy, is an effective mechanism to protect absent class
members' interests."); Lahav, Fundamental Principles, supra note 7, at 128 (arguing that
"[i]n the absence of self-motivated objectors represented by competent counsel," courts
should "appoint a third party to act as a 'devil's advocate' for the class, such as a guardian
ad litem"); Lazos, supra note 302, at 325-32 (proposing the idea of appointing a
guardian ad litem to supervise settlement negotiations, and discussing the advantages
and feasibility of same); Christopher P. Lu, Procedural Solutions to the Attorney's Fee
Problem in Complex Litigation, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 41, 61-66 (1991) (discussing the use
of guardians to help the court evaluate fee petitions); Macey & Miller, supra note 262,
at 47-48 (expressing cautious optimism about the use of guardians); Rubenstein, supra
note 191, at 1453-56 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of using a court
appointed devil's advocate to challenge settlements); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class
Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 529 (2000) (arguing that class counsel and defendant, upon
presentation of settlement, should be required to post a bond to cover the costs of a
court appointed advocate assigned the task of scrutinizing the fairness of the proposed
settlement and making a report to the court); cf. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney
General, supra note 1, at 266 (arguing that appointing an obligatory "devil's advocate"
to challenge settlements or fee awards would be uneconomical and would "overbroadly
chill plaintiffs' incentive" to initiate class actions); Klement, supra note 3, at 50 n.66
(taking pessimistic view of the promise of guardians); Koniak & Cohen, supra note 211,
at 1110-11 (taking a pessimistic view of the potential for court-appointed guardians to
protect the interests of class members).
316 See Macey & Miller, supra note 262, at 56 (observing that "[g]uardians have been
appointed in a few cases, although the practice appears to be uncommon").
317 The separation of "the judicial function of overseeing the litigation from that of
settlement approval" has been suggested as one possible way of counteracting this bias,
but it is a costly approach. Lahav, Fundamental Principles, supra note 7, at 136.
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position to evaluate the deal's fairness than does a court ex post. If
guardians ad litem were given greater access to, and influence over,
settlements negotiations, as some have advocated, perhaps the court
might value their input more.318
An even stronger response to the concern that the views of guardians
would be undervalued by the court would be to actually cede some of
the court's power to them, essentially forcing their influence upon the
court. For example, the guardian could be vested with authority for
negotiating counsel fees,319 or its approval could be made a precondition
to judicial approval of a settlement. This would essentially transform
the guardian into a court-appointed class overseer. While this approach
might be an improvement over the status quo, class member election of
class overseers would do better to tie their allegiance to the class and
legitimize their authority. Commentators have observed that guardians
ad litem may channel the court's structural biases in favor of
settlement.320 This would be of particular concern if the court selected
as guardians individuals or entities without a strong pre-existing
reputational interest in protecting the class.
2. Rewards
If adopted, the trusteeship-based reforms described above would -
it is hoped - improve use of the rewards strategy in class actions by
taking sole responsibility for setting counsel fees away from the court.
Recall that when it comes to executive compensation, judicial oversight
provides only a last line of defense against abusive pay packages.321
Trustees, in the form of independent directors, are given primary
responsibility for devising executive compensation packages. Class
overseers could play a comparable role in the class action setting,
negotiating fees with their chosen class counsel subject o deferential
318 See, e.g., Green, supra note 315, at 1797 (encouraging early appointment of
guardians so that they might influence settlement negotiations).
319 Cf. Court Awarded Att'y Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 255-59 (3d Cir. 1985)
(recommending that courts "appoint a non-judicial representative - who typically will
be an attorney - for the then putative fund beneficiaries, who will negotiate the [fee]
arrangement in the usual marketplace manner and submit the proposal for the court's
approval").
320 See, e.g., Koniak & Cohen, supra note 211, at 1110-11 (explaining that guardians
who want to be reappointed will have an incentive to cultivate "a reputation for not
scuttling deals"); Macey & Miller, supra note 262, at 47 (observing that "[i]f the judges
and lawyers are biased toward settlement they are likely to select passive and compliant
guardians").
321 See supra Part III.A.2.
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court review. Or, more modestly, reputationally-motivated third parties
could be encouraged to assist the court in its fee setting efforts;
compensation consultants provide similar support to the remuneration
committees of public company boards.
The public company analogy suggests at least two other reforms that
could strengthen the rewards strategy in class actions.
a. Shift to Ex Ante Pay Setting
As explained in Part III.A.2, ex post judicial fee setting is suboptimal.
It increases the risk that class action attorneys face, increasing their
incentive to settle more cheaply than the class would prefer. It also
fosters a misplaced focus on the distributional impact of the fee award,
as opposed to its incentive effects, and makes it likely that hindsight
bias will distort the court's fee decision. Moving toward an ex ante model
of fee setting - the model used in public companies - is therefore
desirable. This would naturally follow if the class overseer reform were
adopted, because the class overseer would be expected to negotiate fees
as part of its counsel selection process.322 But this change could be
introduced even if fee setting were left to the court.
I am not the first to recommend that courts set fee terms early in class
action litigation,323 and courts currently possess the authority to do
sO.324 The fact that courts rarely do suggests that they will not
voluntarily adopt this change. Rule 23 should therefore be amended to
require courts to set fee structures at the time counsel is appointed.
There is little perceivable downside to this approach, particularly if
judicial discretion to make changes in the face of unforeseen
circumstances were preserved.
322 To ensure this, the class overseer could be required to file a copy of the retainer
agreement with the court at the outset of the litigation. See Baker et al., supra note 230,
at 1432 (similarly arguing that the lead plaintiff in a securities class action "should
disclose the terms of the negotiated fee to the district court when offering a law firm for
appointment as class counsel").
323 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 255, § 14.211, at 200-01; ROTHSTEIN &
WILLING, supra note 217, at 33; U.S. COURT OF APPEALS THIRD CIRCUIT, THIRD CIRCUIT
TASK FORCE REPORT: SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL 20-22 (2002); Baker et al., supra note
230, at 1424-48; see also Fitzpatrick, Can and Should the New Third-Party, supra note
246, at 119 (asserting "scholars think the best way to set fees is at the outset of the
case").
324 Rule 23 explicitly permits judges to "order potential class counsel to ... propose
terms for attorney's fees and nontaxable costs" and to "include in the appointing order
provisions about the award of attorney's fees or nontaxable costs." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(g)(1)(c)-(d).
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b. Structure Pay to Address Risk Preference Misalignment
Courts lack experience setting fees purely with incentive effects in
mind, and given that it is a departure from the normal judicial function
they may find the task uncomfortable and daunting. It would be wise,
then, to couple a Rule 23 requirement that courts set fees ex ante with
guidance on how to approach the task.325 Among other things, this
guidance should sensitize courts to the risk preference misalignment
that plagues small claims class actions and how class counsel's fee
structure can operate to exacerbate or ameliorate it. The use of
increasing marginal contingency fees should be encouraged as a way to
address the problem. As explained in Part III.A.2, like stock options,
increasing marginal contingency fees help to mitigate risk aversion by
making upside payoffs relatively more valuable. Increasing marginal
contingency fees also help to offset the early settlement endencies that
arise due to the fact that class action attorneys typically face diminishing
returns to efforts.326
The risk preference misalignment that exists between class counsel
and small claims class members could also be mitigated if class counsel
could more easily offload litigation risk. As previously explained, public
325 The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 provide some
guidance to courts on fee setting, but the guidance is vague and largely unhelpful.
Indeed, the notes do not even take a position on whether the lodestar or percentage-of-
the-recovery method of awarding fees is preferable. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 Cmt. to 2003
amendments.
326 A rising marginal contingency fee based on settlement amount might provide that
for up to $X of any recovery, class counsel will earn a 10% contingency fee, with the
percentage increasing by Y% for every additional $Z obtained. The proper bands and
percentages would vary depending on the nature of the case, and scientific exactitude
cannot be expected. But rough incentive alignment is better than none. If determining
the proper dollar parameters proved too difficult because of the novelty of the case, or
if it would be perceived as sacrificing judicial objectivity, increasing marginal
contingency fees might instead be based on the phase of the litigation at the time of
settlement, with higher percentages offered for settlements reached at riskier points.
For example, settlements reached after decision on a motion to dismiss might result in
a higher contingency fee than those reached before, and settlements reached after
discovery has closed or after a summary judgment motion has been decided might result
in yet higher fees. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., Unfaithful Champion, supra note 1, at 47
(observing that it would "seem appropriate to instruct the court to award a more
generous percentage in cases when the plaintiff has gone to trial and thus accepted the
risk of an adverse decision"); Niebler, supra note 221, at 795 (discussing the benefits of
"[i]ncreasing the attorneys' fee as litigation moves into phases that are more complex
and demanding or that require significant additional investment of time"); cf. Bruce L.
Hay, Optimal Contingent Fees in a World of Settlement, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1997)
(arguing that paying a higher contingency fee if the case goes to trial than if the case
settles is desirable when the lawyer controls the settlement decision).
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company executives are able to achieve at least some diversification by
selling their equity grants upon vesting and by taking part of their
compensation in cash salary.327 Class action lawyers, for their part, can
attempt to diversify by bringing in co-counsel to cover some of the
litigation costs in exchange for a portion of the expected attorneys' fees,
and by participating as co-counsel in other cases on similar terms - but
they are forbidden by ethical rules from simply selling a portion of their
expected fee award for cash to a litigation financier.328 Whether the
ethical rules barring this type of transaction should be modified to
permit it is beyond the scope of this already lengthy Article. 329 But one
public company inspired observation is in order for those who would
advocate such change. Corporate law scholars have spilt considerable
ink worrying about the ability of managers to hedge away the incentives
that their pay packages are designed to create.330 This literature suggests
that, if ethical rules were liberalized to allow class action attorneys to
share fees with non-lawyers for cash, the pay setter - whoever that
might be - should have the authority to regulate such arrangements o
327 See supra Part III.A.2.
328 See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
329 A robust debate is currently underway in the United States on precisely this
question. See, e.g., JOHN BEISNER, JESSICA MILLER & GARY RUBIN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR
LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN
THE UNITED STATES (2009); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THIRD PARTY
FINANCING: ETHICAL & LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS IN COLLECTIVE ACTIONS (2009); Fitzpatrick,
supra note 246; Deborah R. Hensler, Third-Party Financing of Class Action Litigation in
the United States: Will the Sky Fall?, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 499 (2014); Samuel Issacharoff,
Litigation Funding and the Problem of Agency Cost in Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL
L. REV. 561 (2014); Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions As We Know Them:
Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 445 (2014).
330 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, How to Tie Equity Compensation to
Long-Term Results, 22J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 99, 105 (2010) ("Given the board's choice
of an equity-based pay structure ... the executive should not be permitted to change
the structure unilaterally by using hedging and derivative transactions."); Sanjai Bhagat
& Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the
Long-term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 367-68 (2009) ("To ensure that the incentive effects
of restricted stock and options are not undone by self-help efforts at diversification,
executives participating in these compensation plans hould be prohibited from
engaging in derivative transactions, such as equity swaps, or borrowing arrangements,
that enable them to hedge their interest in the restricted shares."); Michael Faulkender,
Dalida Kadyrzhanova, N. Prabhala & Lemma Senbet, Executive Compensation: An
Overview of Research on Corporate Practices and Proposed Reforms, 22 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN. 107, 113 (2010) ("[W]e support the view that financial transactions by executives
- particularly hedging transactions that significantly affect the sensitivity of executive
pay to the value of the company - be disclosed to the board and the compensation
committee.").
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that they understand and can control just how much skin class counsel
actually has in the game.331
C. Governance-Based Reforms: Grant Class Members the Right to Vote
on Class Overseer
Shareholder appointment rights help tie directors' allegiance to
shareholders and serve to legitimize the decision control vested in the
corporate board of directors. If class overseers were vested with decision
control over key issues in class actions - like the retention and
compensation of class counsel and settlement - class members would
ideally be given appointment rights as well. The process might work as
follows. Interim class counsel would brief and argue the certification
motion.332 If the motion were granted, notice of the certification would
be sent along with notice of the deadline by which to file motions to
serve as class overseer. These notices would be emailed via
Classaction.gov to class members identified through a search of the
Classaction.gov database as well as to anyone who had registered on the
331 See supra note 330. The Northern District of California has adopted a standing
order requiring disclosure of any class action litigation funders. See STANDING ORDER
FOR ALL JUDGES OF NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA: CONTENTS OF JOINT CASE
MANAGEMENT STATEMENT 2 (2018), https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/wp-content/
uploads/judges/Standing_OrderAllJudges_11.1.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PQU-
ZXCH]; see also Bert I. Huang, Litigation Finance: What Do Judges Need to Know?, 45
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 525, 529-32 (2012) (describing the sort of information about
litigation funding judges should seek out).
The problem of unwinding incentives is probably more severe in the public company
context than it would be in the class action context. When corporate executives sell
their equity grants, they sell them anonymously and piecemeal into an impersonal
secondary market, not to a concentrated purchaser. If a class action attorney were to
sell a portion of its eventual fee recovery to a non-lawyer, by contrast, the buyer would
likely be a single financier or small syndicate of financiers. The buyer would therefore
assume a significant stake in the outcome of the case, and thus would have its own
incentives to monitor class counsel to ensure continued performance. Presumably, the
financier would not make the investment unless it had faith it could do so effectively.
See Coffee, Jr., Unfaithful Champion, supra note 1, at 66 (explaining that, for similar
reasons, the danger of incentive unwinding at most "justifies an upper boundary on fee
sharing arrangements and probably their disclosure to the court, but not their
prohibition"); cf. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate
Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273 (2012) (arguing that litigation financiers in non-class
aggregate litigation can play a monitoring role).
332 This would be either the attorney who filed the putative class complaint (if only
one complaint has been filed) or interim counsel selected by the court (if multiple
complaints have been filed). Interim class counsel might potentially handle motions on
other threshold issues, as well, and would be entitled to compensation even if not
retained as class counsel. See supra note 293.
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site to receive alerts of such notices. They would also be published on
the site. After the deadline for filing a motion to serve as class overseer
passed, the court would screen the potential candidates based on
independence and other objective eligibility criteria. All who passed the
screen would then appear on a ballot emailed to class members, which
would also contain a short narrative disclosure about each candidate.
Class members would then have the opportunity to cast their vote on
the case webpage. The winning candidate, assuming quorum and
minimum vote thresholds were met, would then be tasked with
retaining class counsel and negotiating a fee agreement.333
If parallel class actions were filed in multiple jurisdictions, the class
overseer election would occur only in the first case to be certified.334
The elected class overseer, and their selected class counsel, would then
rightfully represent the class in every parallel case that had been filed.
Together they would make a decision about which forum to press ahead
in, and class counsel would then voluntarily dismiss the suits pending
in the rejected forums. This would produce a huge ancillary benefit: it
would eliminate the risk of a "reverse auction" settlement by denying
the defendant the opportunity to cherry pick which class action to
settle.335
The idea of class members in small claims class actions voting on
anything has long been dismissed as fanciful. Two reasons are typically
cited: the expense associated with providing voting materials to class
members, and the very low likelihood that class members would take
the time to cast informed votes. I will refer to these as the "cost" and
"rational apathy" concerns, respectively. As described below, neither is
insuperable: the creation of Classaction.gov would mitigate the first
concern, and smart design choices - informed by lessons from the
public company - would mitigate the second.
Classaction.gov holds the key to overcoming the cost concern. Once
operational, Classaction.gov could be used to costlessly deliver voting
materials to class members via email. Classaction.gov could also be
imbued with functionality, at fairly low cost, that would allow votes to
be cast and automatically tabulated on the website. To be sure, creating
and maintaining the website and supporting administration would
require a significant investment, but as explained in Classaction.gov the
333 All settlement discussions would be delayed until after the class was certified, the
class overseer elected, and class counsel selected.
334 Classaction.gov would make it easy to identify parallel class actions. See Rose,
supra note 26, at 18, 21-22.
335 For a discussion of the reverse auction problem, see Wasserman, supra note 315,
at 472-74.
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benefits it would generate justify that investment, and funding sources
exist.336
Classaction.gov would also help with the rational apathy concern.
Rational class members will not bother to cast informed votes in class
overseer elections if the personal costs outweigh the personal benefits.
The personal costs of voting include the time it takes to physically
execute one's vote and the time it takes to educate one's elf about the
candidates and make a decision. Classaction.gov would greatly reduce
the cost of physically executing the vote. It is far less time consuming
to cast a vote online than it is to take the time to fill out and mail a paper
ballot. Because the voting materials would be sent from a trustworthy
Classaction.gov email address, and would be presented in a consistent
and easy-to-digest format, class members would also save the time they
might otherwise spend determining the authenticity and meaning of
those materials. These costs savings are critical, given that the personal
benefits to class members from voting will necessarily be small,
representing some fraction of the value of the class member's claim.
Even if the costs associated with physically executing one's vote were
reduced to zero, however, the time it would take to make an informed
decision might alone render class member apathy rational. How likely
is this? Selecting a class overseer is one of the easier choices class
members could be asked to make. The question presented is a fairly
simple, easily intelligible one: which candidate has the best incentive
and ability to monitor class counsel in the interests of the class? This is
easier than the question of who should serve as class counsel, for
example.337 It is also easier than determining the merits of a settlement
proposal, which requires understanding the strength of the legal claims
and defenses at issue in the case - an understanding that class members
will not naturally possess and will not take the time to acquire.338
Whether the question is easy enough to make class member voting
336 See Rose, supra note 26, at 24-25.
337 Such a decision requires an understanding of the firm's experience, the fee it
would demand, and its competing obligations, among other things. It is a question
better left to the discretion of the class overseer (subject to deferential court review),
just as the selection of corporate executives is left to the board.
338 This is one reason why I do not recommend that settlements be subject to class
member approval, even though a vote on a settlement negotiated by class counsel with
class overseer approval would be akin to a shareholder vote on a board-approved sale
of a company. Classaction.gov would, however, allow courts to embed polls in notices
of proposed settlements sent to class members. This could be particularly helpful to a
court seeking to determine the true value of a coupon settlement to class members. Like
shareholder say-on-pay votes, non-binding class member polls would represent a type
of quasi-decision right.
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rational, however, will ultimately depend on who the class overseer
candidates turn out to be.
If typical candidates turn out to be high-profile individuals or
respected organizations - such as government agencies or officials,
well-known non-profits, or professors or clinics associated with
reputable law schools - the decision may be easy enough for class
members to make. Class members could quickly identify, based on pre-
existing knowledge, a trustworthy candidate for whom to cast a vote
simply by looking at the candidates' names and affiliations. But what if
these actors do not volunteer themselves as candidates, or fail to do so
in some subset of cases? One possibility, already alluded to, is that class
oversight would become a niche legal specialty, with private lawyers
routinely stepping up as candidates. This would present a challenge for
class member voting, because class members would have no pre-
existing knowledge about such candidates to help them choose between
them. Mandatory disclosure of a candidate's credentials is not a
complete solution to this problem, because class members are unlikely
to invest time in reviewing such disclosures.339 Confronted with a list
of unfamiliar names, class members might instead opt not to vote at all,
or might choose blindly. The result could be the election of bad class
overseers.
A few solutions to the "bad" class overseer problem were previewed
earlier.340 For example, class members could be given the option of
voting for standard judicial oversight rather than any candidate. This
could also be the default if quorum requirements were not met, or if no
candidate hit a minimum vote threshold. But these approaches,
standing alone, threaten to throw the baby out with the bath water.
While there may be some bad candidates who emerge from the private
bar, there may be many more highly capable ones. What is needed is a
way to make it easy for class members to distinguish between the two,
resulting in class overseers being elected in more cases. The public
company analogy suggests some solutions. To be sure, there is much
339 In addition to information about their experience and qualifications, to cast
informed votes class members would need to know the reason for the candidate's
interest in playing the role, including any ideological hostility the candidate bears
towards the claims at issue or class actions in general, and any other conflicting interests
the candidate may have in the case. As previously discussed, class overseers with
financial or familial ties to the defendant (including by virtue of past political or
charitable donations) should be flatly prohibited by independence requirements, and
class overseers should be forbidden from retaining as class counsel firms with whom
they have familial or financial ties (including by virtue of past political or charitable
donations). See supra notes 289, 294-296 and accompanying text.
340 See supra Part JV.B.1.a.
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about shareholder voting that is rightly subject to critique.341
Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider how public company
shareholders - for whom rational apathy concerns also run high -
economize on voting decision costs. As explained earlier, two common
ways involve (1) following the voting recommendations of firms who
specialize in providing it and (2) delegating voting authority to trusted
third parties.342
In the class action context, class members could similarly economize
on decision costs by relying on the voting recommendations of
reputable third parties. One possibility would be an endorsement
system. If government agencies and other trusted third parties took
interest in a case but were unable or unwilling to serve as class overseer,
they might be given an opportunity to expressly endorse one of the class
overseer candidates, or to endorse a vote in favor of standard judicial
oversight, if they viewed that as the best option given the low quality of
the candidates. Before voting materials were sent to class members, a
list of candidates could be published on Classaction.gov and emailed to
registrants who have set their alerts to receive such lists. Parties
interested in submitting an endorsement could then be given a period
of time in which to do so. The endorsements ubmitted could then be
prominently displayed in the voting materials sent to class members
(assuming - importantly - that the endorsing party meets
independence and other eligibly requirements343), along with a brief
341 Among other things, shareholder voting has been handicapped by the lack of a
universal proxy ballot and the expense of running an independent proxy solicitation.
These problems do not need to be - and should not be - replicated in the class action
context. For example, class members would not have to take any affirmative steps to
nominate class overseer candidates or solicit votes on their behalf; instead, the
expectation is that class overseer candidates would volunteer, with all who meet
eligibility requirements entitled to appear on a single ballot.
342 See supra Part II.B.2.a.
343 The endorser should be required to be independent of the class overseer
candidate it endorses, in the sense of having no material familial or financial
relationship with it (including by virtue of past political or charitable donations). The
endorser should also be required to be independent of the defendant. The risk that
endorsers would privately condition their endorsement of a class overseer on the
candidate's promise to select as class counsel a firm with whom the endorser has a
familial or financial tie (including by virtue of past political or charitable donations)
could be dealt with in at least two ways. The first is a disclosure approach. Specifically,
the endorser could be required to attest under penalty of perjury that their endorsement
is not based on any such condition. The endorser could also be required to disclose
whether it has any familial or financial ties (including by virtue of past political or
charitable donations) to law firms that may be interested in the position of class counsel.
The second approach is more prophylactic: the class overseer could simply be
prohibited from retaining as class counsel any law firm or individual who has a familial
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description of the endorser's identity and interest in the case. Class
members could then cast votes based on the endorsements of the
individuals or entities that they trust, without investing time in learning
about the candidates directly.
Another approach that would require even less of class members
would be a permanent proxy system. When an individual first registered
on Classaction.gov, they could be given the option of choosing to
delegate their voting authority in any future case that they find
themselves a class member in to a trusted third party who has
volunteered for the responsibility. The options could be multifaceted.
For example, a consumer non-profit might be willing to serve as a proxy
only in cases involving certain types of consumer claims. A registrant
on Classaction.gov could choose this non-profit to act as her proxy for
all such cases and select the Federal Trade Commission for all other
cases. The selected proxy would then be responsible for casting a vote
for class overseer on her behalf in future cases (assuming no conflict of
interest344), unless and until she chose to revoke the proxy's authority.
This approach would completely eliminate the need for class members
to incur any costs at all in connection with a specific class overseer vote;
or financial tie (including by virtue of past political or charitable donations) to those
who endorsed the class overseer in the election. Cf. supra notes 294-296 and
accompanying text. The latter approach might inhibit some governmental actors from
making endorsements, for fear of discouraging campaign contributions by plaintiffs'-
side law firms. It is also possible that the rule could be used strategically to block certain
deserving law firms from being selected as class counsel. Nevertheless, the more
prophylactic approach is probably superior to the disclosure approach, given the low
likelihood that class members will pay attention to disclosures. Other eligibility criteria
for endorsing a class overseer candidate might include the absence of criminal history,
the absence of any court or administrative finding of unethical or dishonest conduct in
the past ten years, and compliance with required disclosures.
344 A proxy should be disqualified from voting in any case in which it has familial or
financial ties to the defendant (including by virtue of past political or charitable
donations); registrants on Classaction.gov could select a back-up proxy to vote on their
behalf in such an eventuality. Proxies hould also be barred from voting for any class
overseer candidate with whom they have familial or financial ties (including by virtue
of past political or charitable donations); if the proxy would prefer to abstain than vote
for another candidate, affected class members' back-up proxies could vote on their
behalf in the case. An exception to this bar should apply, however, if the candidate is
the proxy - if a class member trusted the proxy to vote on her behalf, presumably she
would be comfortable with the proxy serving as class overseer directly. As with
endorsers selecting who to endorse, there is a risk that proxies would privately
condition their vote for a class overseer on the candidate's promise to select as class
counsel a firm with whom the proxy has familial or financial ties (including by virtue
of past political or charitable donations). To prevent this, the prophylactic approach
described in footnote 343, supra, should be adopted; class members who grant a
permanent proxy cannot be expected to pay attention to case-specific disclosures.
422 [Vol. 54:337
Cutting Class Action Agency Costs
they would just need to make a one-time, up-front investment in
selecting a permanent proxy.345
The endorsement and the permanent proxy approaches are not
mutually exclusive, but could work together to help ensure that bad
class overseer candidates are not elected in cases where candidates are
unfamiliar to class members.346 These approaches would not only allow
class members to economize on decision costs, they would also allow
government agencies and non-profits to play a role in more cases than
they would otherwise be able to: instead of assuming the more time
consuming role of class overseer directly, these actors would only need
to form an opinion on who the class overseer should be. Their influence
in elections would also have the beneficial effect of encouraging private
attorneys to be faithful trustees to the class: private attorneys who
wished to garner repeat engagements as class overseer would have an
incentive to do well by class members, because their reputation would
matter in future class overseer elections.
347
D. Regulatory-Based Reforms: Free Transferability of Class Claims
Reducing the costs to class members of casting an informed vote in
the ways described above would mitigate the rational apathy concern.
So, too, would increasing the benefit to class members of casting an
informed vote. This could be accomplished if the aggregation of class
claims was made feasible through free transferability. As explained
below, free transferability would facilitate the emergence of larger stakes
class members with more to gain from a case being well governed -
class members that are more akin to engaged institutional investors and
hedge fund activists than rationally apathetic retail investors.348
The existence of larger stakes class members could produce
additional benefits, beyond its ability to bolster the effectiveness of a
class member vote on class overseer. Larger stakes class members would
themselves make compelling class overseer candidates, for example,
and they might find it economically rational to take on that
responsibility. Larger stakes class members might also find it
345 A registrant would be free to revoke the authority previously granted to a proxy
at any time by simply visiting their personal settings page on the Classaction.gov
website.
346 Indeed, all parties who will exercise proxy voting authority in a case should be
required to endorse the candidate that they intend to vote for, so that class members
who have granted them authority can, if desired, observe this intention and revoke the
authority prior to the vote if they disagree.
347 See supra note 292.
348 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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worthwhile to lodge objections to proposed settlements that they
believe are inadequate; because of the economic stake they would have
in the case, courts would likely view these objections as more credible
than the sort they receive from class members today. Opting out to
pursue litigation separately might also make sense for larger stakes class
members, and the threat of this could in turn help to discipline class
counsel.
The creation of Classaction.gov would make the aggregation of class
claims feasible. In addition to its other functions, Classaction.gov could
operate as a platform for the low-cost exchange of class claims. An
example will help to demonstrate how it could work. Imagine a case
brought on behalf of everybody who purchased widgets from Alpha
Corporation in 2017. Class members, identified through a search of the
Classaction.gov database using names from Alpha Corporation's
customer list, would receive emailed notice of the certification and the
deadline for filing a motion to serve as class overseer, as would other
registrants on Classaction.gov who signed up to receive such notices.
The notice would also be published on Classaction.gov. After
certification, any registrant on Classaction.gov (other than the
defendant and class counsel) would be permitted to post bids to
purchase however many class claims they would like at whatever price
they want-for example, a bidder might offer $3 for a one-widget claim,
$6 for a two-widget claim, etc., and leave the offer open until he acquires
$20,000 worth of claims. Prior to posting, bidders would be required to
electronically transfer funds to cover their bids to the Classaction.gov
administrative account.349
To prevent an adverse selection problem from arising, only class
members who had successfully verified their class claims would be
eligible to accept bids posted on Classaction.gov. The required
verification process would be the same as the process class members
would need to undergo to later claim settlement funds. Class members
would fill out an online form that poses questions to establish their
eligibility and extent of damage (e.g., "Did you purchase widgets from
Alpha Corporation in 2017? If so, how many do you estimate?") and, if
determined by the presiding judge to be necessary, upload supporting
documentation (e.g., a JPEG image of a receipt).350 Class members with
34 Unused funds would automatically revert to the bidder's account at the expiration
of the bid.
350 This means that the content of the form would need to be determined at the time
of certification, based on the allegations in the complaint and any pre-certification court
rulings. If it is obvious that all potential class members identified through the database
search would be entitled to participate in any recovery, were one achieved, and each in
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verified claims could also post offers to sell, which any registrant on
Classaction.gov (other than the defendant and class counsel) could
accept by transferring the purchase price to the Classaction.gov
administrative account.
Classaction.gov would record these transactions and cause
appropriate funds to be transferred electronically from Classaction.gov's
administrative account to the account the seller indicated they wanted
funds deposited into when they registered. Once the transaction
cleared, all further communications in the case would be automatically
redirected to the purchaser, and the purchaser would succeed to the
class member's rights to vote for class overseer (if the transaction
occurred prior to the election), to opt out (if the transaction occurred
before the opt-out period had ended), and to receive any future
settlement funds.351
Notice what this is not: it is not a mechanism for funding the
litigation. The Classaction.gov exchange would facilitate secondary
market trades, with the proceeds going to class members, not class
counsel. The point is to potentially create a situation where larger stakes
class members would emerge who, like institutional investors and
hedge funds in the public company context, might take a real interest
in monitoring the enterprise. Because the proceeds would not be used
to fund the litigation, and because the sales would not result in any
claims being brought that were not already being brought, the exchange
should not raise the trio of "champerty," "maintenance," and "barratry"
objections typically lodged against claims alienation proposals.35 2
The type of legal claims that are amenable to class treatment are
typically assignable,353 and the envisioned exchange would simply
the same or a self-evident amount, then their claims would be automatically verified.
Class members who self-identified after seeing the notice of certification on
Classaction.gov, however, would always be required to verify in order to exercise any
rights as a class member, including to participate in a class overseer election. The court
should police the verification process closely to ensure that is not overly onerous. For
example, in many cases supporting documentation, if even necessary, might properly
be required only of class members who self-identified.
351 In the event parallel class actions were pending in different jurisdictions, the first
case to be certified would be the first and only case in which claims sales would be
conducted. Purchasers of verified claims would therefore be assured of their ability to
recover in whichever of the parallel actions was subsequently taken to final judgment.
See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
352 See generally Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of
Champions or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 639 (1995)
(discussing these doctrines).
353 See id. at 640 (explaining that while personal injury claims cannot be assigned,
contract and tort claims for property damage generally can); see also 6 AM. JUR. 2D
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create a low-cost way for class members to assign their legal claims to
third parties who value them more.354 Purchasers would seek to profit
by paying less for a class claim than their estimate of the claim's
expected value, discounted to reflect the purchaser's own risk
preferences. Selling class members might be willing to sell because they
are more risk averse than the purchaser, prefer immediate over delayed
payment, or have a more pessimistic view on the claim's expected value.
To be sure, there will be informational asymmetries in this market
that will systematically favor purchasers over selling class members. It
is not rational for a small claims class member to spend time researching
the value of their legal claim, but it could be highly profitable for
someone who intends to purchase hundreds or thousands of such
claims. Some readers may therefore raise fairness objections to this
proposal. Such objections are unwarranted. First, competitive bidding
amongst purchasers may offer some protection to class members by
driving prices up.355 Second, the sums at stake are quite small for selling
class members. The injustice of a class member receiving $3 for a claim
worth $5 should hardly keep anyone up at night, especially once the
governance benefits that larger stakes class members could produce are
taken into account. Finally, sophisticated investors profit by trading
with less informed retail investors all the time in the public capital
markets. This imbalance is not viewed as problematic so long as the
exchange is voluntary, and the more informed party has not
inappropriately utilized inside information. Nothing in my proposal
compels class members to sell their class claims. Moreover, as noted
Assignments § 50 (2020) (explaining that statutory claims are generally assignable if
remedial rather than punitive). If there was doubt regarding the assignability of the
claims at issue, potential purchasers could move the court to issue a declaratory
judgment on the matter before claims sales commenced. Congress might also consider
passing a statute affirmatively permitting the assignment of federal claims asserted in
class actions certified under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
354 Cases brought on behalf of public company shareholders should be excluded.
Selling rights appurtenant to publicly traded stock would have the negative effect of
diminishing the fungibility of shares. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 95-96 (1985) (making a
similar observation about the consequences of a rule of unlimited shareholder liability).
It would also present practical difficulties given that most shares are held in
undifferentiated bulk with the Depository Trust Company. See Charles R. Korsmo &
Minor Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition: Replacing Class Actions with a Market for Legal
Claims, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1323, 1359 (2016).
355 I have no illusion that there would emerge an efficient secondary market in class
claims that would mimic all of the advantages of the public capital markets. But this is
not necessary for the exchange to help reduce class action agency costs in the ways
described above, at least in some cases.
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above both class counsel and the defendant would be excluded from
participating in this market.356 In order to trade, purchasers and sellers
might also be required to check a box indicating, under penalty of
perjury, that they have received no confidential or privileged
information from class or defense counsel.
This proposal shares features with, but enjoys distinct advantages
over, several notable market-based class action reform proposals that
have been advanced by scholars in the past. For example, in a seminal
article, Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller proposed that small-claims
class actions be sold to the highest bidder at a judicially-supervised
auction.357 This would overcome agency costs because the "winning
bidder becomes the owner of the claim, and therefore acts as its own
agent."358 The Macey-Miller proposal would, in essence, eliminate class
action collective action problems by eliminating the collective. The
public company analogy is a going private transaction. The
Classaction.gov exchange could similarly facilitate the complete merger
of claim ownership and control, because nothing would stop bidders
from offering to purchase all outstanding class claims. Unlike with the
Macey-Miller proposal, however, this could be accomplished without
placing significant burdens on the court.359  Importantly, the
Classaction.gov exchange would also allow bidders to purchase partial
stakes in class actions. The expense and risk profile of this strategy
356 To be meaningful, this prohibition should extend to those controlling, controlled
by, or under common control with class counsel and the defendant. Excluding class
counsel and the defendant is warranted based on more than simple fairness concerns.
Excluding class counsel would also eliminate any incentive class counsel might have to
manipulate its handling of the case in the early stages, so as to create an impression that
the case is weaker than it is. Excluding defendants is warranted because the exchange
is intended to help reduce class action agency costs, not to provide a vehicle for
defendants to exploit class member collective action problems to settle on the cheap.
357 See Macey & Miller, supra note 262, at 6. Macey and Miller were the first to fully
explore this idea, which had been raised in prior literature. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr.,
Unfaithful Champion, supra note 1, at 78-79, 78 n.299 (attributing the idea of auctioning
a class action to Professor Frank Easterbrook).
358 Macey & Miller, supra note 262, at 108.
359 Under the Macey-Miller proposal, in each case the court would need to determine
if the class action was suitable for auction treatment based on a variety of factors,
precisely define the claim (which may require the taking of discovery), devise an auction
procedure, publicize and conduct the auction, and distribute the funds. By contrast, the
only burden my proposal places on the court in individual cases is to approve the claims
form earlier in the litigation than would otherwise be required, so as to facilitate the
claims verification process. Of course, my proposal also requires that Classaction.gov
and its supporting administration be created and maintained, but as argued in
Classaction.gov this is independently worthwhile. There would also be the marginal cost
of imbuing Classaction.gov with the functionality needed to act as an online exchange.
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would likely be attractive to a much broader set of potential bidders
than would purchasing the class action in its entirety.360
In a more recent article, Charles Korsmo and Minor Myers have
advocated for the free alienability of legal claims as an alternative to class
actions.361 They argue that the severe agency costs that attend use of the
class device as a mechanism for aggregating legal claims could be
avoided if instead third parties simply purchased claims directly from
their holders and then pursued litigation in their own right - engaging
in "aggregation by acquisition," as they dub it, instead of aggregation by
procedure.362 Like the Macey-Miller proposal, the Korsmo-Myers
proposal would eliminate agency costs by merging ownership and
control of legal claims. But unlike the Macey-Miller proposal - and like
my proposal - it would avoid the need for a purchaser to come up with
the funding necessary to acquire an entire class action as well as the
need for the court to oversee a complicated auction process.
Unfortunately, their proposal would also introduce a new set of
practical difficulties. Most problematically, a would-be claims acquirer
would have to personally seek out claimants and negotiate purchases
on a one-on-one basis. Transaction costs would doom this endeavor in
cases involving negative-value claims. As a consequence, negative-value
claims aggregated today through the class device would simply not be
brought at all, with a concomitant loss in deterrence. The
Classaction.gov exchange that I propose would eliminate the
transaction cost barrier to aggregating negative-value claims by
acquisition. Purchasers could use the exchange to aggregate legal
claims, then opt out of the class and pursue relief in a separate action of
the type that Korsmo and Myers envision. Importantly, though,
purchasers would not have to pursue litigation on their own if they did
not wish to, and those class members who did not sell their legal claims
would nevertheless see their claims pursued. The small claims class
action, and its deterrence benefits, would therefore be preserved.
My proposal also promises to more effectively achieve the goal of a
market-based class action reform proposal advanced by John Coffee.
Professor Coffee has argued that opt-out rights should routinely be
360 Macey and Miller suggest auctioning the right to represent he class as a second-
best option. This idea has garnered significant scholarly and judicial attention, with
most commentators concluding that it is unworkable in practice. See supra note 274;
see also Korsmo & Meyers, supra note 354, at 1342 ("IT] he auction of the lead counsel
role has . . . attracted sustained criticism in the literature and has failed to generate any
momentum in the courts.").
361 See generally Korsmo & Meyers, supra note 354.
362 See id. at 1357.
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delayed until after the approval of a proposed settlement, at which time
competing attorneys could run opt-out campaigns to try to sway class
members to join rival class actions rather than stay in the original class
and accept the settlement.363 He analogizes the disciplining effect this
could have on class counsel, whose fees depend on the size of the class,
to the disciplining effect the threat of a hostile takeover has on corporate
managers.364 But Professor Coffee concedes that rival opt-out
solicitations are unlikely to work well in small claims class actions,
given rational apathy concerns: whether to accept a settlement on the
table or gamble on a rival class action brought by another unfamiliar
attorney is simply too hard of a question to expect small claims class
members to answer.365 An offer to purchase claims via the
Classaction.gov exchange, by contrast, presents class members with a
simple choice - even a child would understand that they should accept
the offer only if the price is higher than the value they expect to derive
from the class settlement. By offering a premium to the settlement, then,
competing attorneys (either directly or through investor clients) could
use the Classaction.gov exchange to easily amass class claims, opt out,
and bring a rival action. This would discipline class counsel in precisely
the way Professor Coffee seeks: "[k] nowing that class members can flee
an inadequate or unattractive settlement, [class counsel has] less
incentive to enter one (at least to the extent [the] expected fee award
will decline); and defendants will also be less prepared to settle on such
a basis."366
My proposal also enjoys advantages over market-based proposals
advanced by Alon Klement and Charles Silver and Sam Dinkin. While
the specifics differ, both the Klement and Silver-Dinkin proposals seek
to manufacture a party with good incentives to monitor class counsel
by auctioning off a percentage of the class's recovery to the highest
bidder willing to assume a formal monitoring role.367 As with the
Macey-Miller proposal, a major drawback of these proposals is the
burden they would place on the court: it would be complicated for
judges to structure and conduct the envisioned auctions, and there
363 See Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability, supra note 6, at 421-25.
364 See id. at 422.
365 See id. at 425.
366 Id. at 421.
367 See generally Klement, supra note 3; Charles Silver & Sam Dinkin, Incentivizing
Institutional Investors to Serve as Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 57
DEPAUL L. REV. 471 (2008).
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would be no guarantee that bidders would even emerge.368 My proposal
would achieve comparable ends as the Klement and Silver-Dinkin
proposals, but without imposing on the court: purchasers could simply
buy a stake in the case by purchasing claims via Classaction.gov and
then volunteer as a class overseer candidate. Importantly, though, under
my proposal multiple larger stakes class members could potentially
emerge, and running for class overseer would not be required. A larger
stakes class member might prefer to simply cast an informed vote for
another class overseer candidate, or to lodge an objection if an
inadequate settlement is proposed. These actions would be beneficial in
their own right.
CONCLUSION
This Article has been long. The conclusion will be short. The public
company analogy provides a richer source of inspiration for class action
reform than scholars have previously acknowledged. The
comprehensive comparison of agency-cost-reduction techniques
utilized in the public company and class action contexts undertaken
herein suggests a package of bold ideas to improve the functioning of
small claims class actions - ideas that are worthy of further
consideration by scholars and policymakers alike.
368 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Competing Bids in Class Action Settlements, 31 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 633, 643-50 (2003) (proposing an ex post auction for lead counsel rights but
conceding that, like other auction proposals, it would place significant burdens on the
court).
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